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COMMENTS
MANDATORY ARBITRATION: STRIPPING
SECURITIES INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES
OF THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS
In a recent series of decisions, negative judicial attitudes toward arbi-
tration1 have shifted to more positive views, resulting in current treat-
ment of arbitration as a favored method of dispute resolution.2 The
enforceability of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements (PDAAs)3 in rela-
tion to statutory claims is an issue that has been extensively litigated.4 In
1. Arbitration, an alternative to litigation, permits "a dispute between two or more
parties [to be] resolved by impartial persons . . . knowledgeable in the areas in contro-
versy." SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURES 3 (1992) [hereinafter ARBITRATION PROCEDURES]; see also HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES I
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 GAO REPORT]. "Arbitration is the submission of a dispute be-
tween parties to a neutral third party-an arbitrator-for resolution." Id.
2. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (finding that arbitration was not
as effective as litigation for ensuring that investors receive the protections of the securities
laws); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27
(1985) (stating that "we are well past the time" of judicial suspicion of arbitration and the
competence of arbitrators, and noting that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 and n.32 (1983) (stating that the "liberal federal
policy favoring" pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) is manifested through the
FAA).
3. A Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement should be differentiated from a Post-Dis-
pute Arbitration Agreement. Pre-dispute agreements are made prior to any dispute, and
"without a party's full understanding of the waiver or of possible liabilities because the
dispute has not yet materialized." Jenifer A. Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbi-
tration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 643 n.18
(1992). On the other hand, "[i]n post-dispute agreements, the parties acknowledge that
they are waiving a judicial forum for resolution of a known dispute. They are presump-
tively aware of potential liabilities." Id. Throughout this Comment, the author uses the
term PDAA as the equivalent of what is commonly known as an arbitration agreement.
4. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (requiring a judicial forum to protect the substan-
tive rights created by the Securities Act of 1933); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 47-55 (1974) (refusing to give preclusive effect to an arbitral decision involving a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-40 (en-
forcing an arbitration clause in a commercial contract arising under the Sherman Antitrust
Act); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-42 (1987) (holding both
the Securities and Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
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1991, the Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'
addressed the enforceability of a PDAA contained in a registered repre-
sentative's 6 standard application for securities industry registration (Form
U-4).7 The plaintiff's claim arose under the Federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),8 and the Court's holding opened the door
Act claims arbitrable in a domestic dispute); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1989) (holding 1934 Act claims arbitrable); see also C.
EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES 29 (Larry D. Soderquist ed.
1990) (explaining that "[tihe enforceability of arbitration clauses has been litigated exten-
sively in past years").
5. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a PDAA between a registered representative and
a stock exchange, contained in Form U-4, mandates arbitration of claims arising under the
ADEA). Gilmer, as a requirement of employment with Interstate/Johnson Lane Corpora-
tion (Interstate), registered with several stock exchanges. Id. at 23. His registration appli-
cation provided that Gilmer " 'agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy.'
Id.
6. "Registered representatives are firm employees who accept and execute custom-
ers' buy-and-sell orders." 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; see 15 DAVID A. LIPTON,
BROKER-DEALER REGULATION, § 2.05[1], at 2-48 to 2-49 (stating that all persons associ-
ated with an NASD member firm must register with the NASD). Securities firms fre-
quently require employees to register with one or more stock exchanges, thus becoming
registered representatives (RRs). See 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that,
"[r]egistered representatives constitute approximately 32 percent of securities industry em-
ployees in the largest 50 securities firms in the United States"). Pursuant to the PDAA in
their registration application, RRs "agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy
that may arise." Id. The rules of most exchanges and the NASD provide for arbitration of
employment disputes as an alternative to the judicial forum for resolving controversies
between market professionals and their customers and among market professionals. Mark
D. Fitterman & Robert Asher Love, The Regulatory Framework of Securities Arbitration,
in SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND FORMS § 1.01, at 1-1, 1-4 (Anthony Djinis &
Joseph A. Post eds., 1994) [hereinafter SECURITIES ARBITRATION]; e.g., NATIONAL Asso-
CIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 4, § 1 (Dec. 1993)
[hereinafter NASD CAP]; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND
RULES (CCH) 2347, Rule 347 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter NYSE RULE].
7. Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer,
item 5, reprinted in SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at app. 1C-2 (highlighting the
boilerplate provision found several pages into the Form U-4, whereby RRs agree to arbi-
trate any controversy that might arise between them and the firm that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules of the securities exchanges); e.g. NYSE RULE 347. Form U-4 is
used as the application for those associated with a firm as securities representatives. LIP-
TON, supra note 6, § 2.05[1], at 2-49.
8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)) (prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of age against workers over age 40).
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to compulsory arbitration 9 of employment discrimination claims in the
securities industry's private arbitration system.'0
Gilmer has had a significant impact on securities industry employment
litigation." Gilmer mandates that a PDAA can be invoked for the settle-
ment of statutory employment law claims in the industry, nullifying the
9. Compulsory arbitration refers to the judicial enforcement of PDAAs to resolve
disputes through binding arbitration. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining compulsory arbitration as that which takes place when the consent of one of the
parties is enforced by statutory provisions). "Issues of compelling or resisting arbitration
arise when one party to an apparently arbitrable dispute refuses to participate in the arbi-
tration or seeks to use the judicial process ... either to resolve the entire dispute or to
obtain partial relief ... outside the arbitration proceeding." Carol Goodman, Compelling
or Resisting Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 5.01[1] at 5-6.
10. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(26) (1994) [hereinafter
1934 Act] (defining a self-regulatory organization); GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS FARE, 14
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 GAO REPORT] (explaining the securities industry as one that "ad-
ministers and oversees arbitration according to the industry's principle of self-regulation").
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) "are groups of industry professionals [that both]...
operate and regulate" market facilities. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. SROs,
which include the nine securities exchanges, such as the New York and the American Stock
Exchanges, and the NASD, which regulates the over-the-counter market, are overseen by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") through the review, ap-
proval, or rejection of SRO rules under section 19(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (b).
See id. (providing that SROs must file proposed rule changes with the Commission, includ-
ing the rules governing the conduct of its arbitration programs which are based on the
Uniform Code of Arbitration). SROs have "primary regulatory responsibility [under the
1934 Act] to adopt and enforce standards of conduct for their member securities firms."
1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; see the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (providing that
no registration of a national securities exchange shall be granted or remain in force unless
its rules provide for the expulsion, suspension, or discipline of a member for conduct incon-
sistent with just and equitable principles of trade); see also SECURITIES ARBITRATION,
supra note 6, § 1.02[1], [2], at 1-14 to 1-15 (explaining the Commission's review of arbitra-
tion rules); infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text (discussing the SRO's role in the
arbitration process).
11. Subsequent to Gilmer, federal and state courts consistently have upheld agree-
ments to arbitrate disputes between employers and employees, including discrimination
claim disputes. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698,699 (11th Cir.
1992) (discussing Title VII and state law claims of battery, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and negligent retention); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229, 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (Title VII), dismissed, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Bird v. Shear-
son Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116,117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S 1251
(1991) (ERISA); Kaliden v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 179, 180 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (ADEA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Moore v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1466 (D.N.J. July 23, 1991)
(ADEA, New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, and the New Jersey Law
against Discrimination); Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way?
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims after Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 197, 197 (1993-1994) (stating that in response to Gilmer, federal and state courts
hearing discrimination claims both inside and outside the securities industry have com-
pelled arbitration).
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view that such claims may not be subject to compulsory arbitration. 12
However, the current securities industry arbitration system may not be
capable of preserving the intentions of the civil rights statutes nor ade-
quately resolving the claims of industry employees in adherence with cur-
rent employment law. 3 This potential clash between Gilmer and the
intentions underlying the civil rights statutes needs to be resolved.
Securities industry arbitration was not designed to resolve the range of
claims it currently encompasses. 14 The initial intent of securities industry
arbitration was to resolve commercial disputes between the industry and
public investors by providing them with an impartial third party who pos-
sessed an understanding of the securities industry. 5 In the commercial
12. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 11, at 199 (stating that Gilmer rejects the tradi-
tional view that employment-related claims are not arbitrable).
13. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt With a Sex-
Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al (illustrating the typical course of events result-
ing in mandatory securities industry arbitration). Helen Walters, a trading-room secretary
at a California brokerage firm, filed a complaint alleging what appeared to be a clear ex-
ample of sexual harassment. Id. at Al, A6. She claimed that her boss subjected her to
crude anatomical slang, obscene name calling, physical threats, and unwanted gifts of con-
doms. Id. at Al. Walters' claim was arbitrated pursuant to the PDAA in her Form U-4.
Id. at A6. The New York Stock Exchange oversaw the arbitration proceedings and em-
paneled three male arbitrators to hear the case-none of whom had any experience or
training in current discrimination or sex-bias law. Id. The arbitrators focused witness
questioning on the characterization of the behavior in question relative to the norm in the
securities industry. Id. Their inquiry, however, should have been whether a reasonable
person in the circumstances in which the complainant found herself would find the work
environment "hostile or abusive." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 73 (1986)
(finding that discriminatory behavior depends on the victim's perception that the environ-
ment is hostile). The arbitrators ultimately dismissed Walters' case. Jacobs, supra, at Al.
14. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 1.01 [21, at 1-6 (stating that the Uni-
form Code of Arbitration (Uniform Code) has expanded from its intended focus on
"'small claims' to provide a uniform set of rules for the arbitration of all investor/broker-
dealer disputes"). Currently, the Uniform Code is invoked for the resolution of intra-
industry disputes, such as disputes between a brokerage firm and their employees. Id.; see
also Diana B. Henriques, When Na'vetd Meets Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at Cl,
C6 (explaining that the securities arbitration system is designed to be pro-investor and not
designed to process the volume or complexity of the cases it now handles); infra notes 136-
38 and accompanying text (discussing the original narrow intent of the securities industry
arbitration system).
15. Originally, the Commission delegated development of a model arbitration system
for the resolution of small claims to the SROs who implemented an investor dispute reso-
lution system, including a uniform arbitration code. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra
note 6, § 1.01[2], at 1-5, (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13470 (April 26,
1977)); see also SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, FIFTH REPORT 2-3
(April 1986) (stating that Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), com-
posed of representatives of all of the SROs as well as the public, drafted the Uniform
Code, a mechanism for resolving disputes between brokers, dealers, and customers) [here-
inafter SICA REPORT #5]; 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 15 n.2 (stating that
"SICA's original mandate was to develop rules for the resolution of disputes involving
small claims").
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dispute context, arbitration offers many advantages over litigation, and is
an efficient and desired substitute for judicial resolution of disputes.16 In
true "securities" disputes (non-employment related commercial cases),
these advantages make arbitration very attractive. 17 On the other hand,
while employment discrimination claims involve the industry and its em-
ployees, they typically do not involve the same issues as commercial dis-
putes involving the industry and public investors. 8
Criticisms of securities industry arbitration with respect to employ-
ment-related disputes do not focus on deficiencies in the arbitration pro-
cess, but rather, on the underlying effects of arbitration. 9 While an
16. For example, because arbitrators possess an understanding of industry practices
the chances are enhanced that an accurate outcome is achieved faster because less time is
spent "educating the trier of fact." FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 106-07 (noting, "[a]ny
lawyer who has had to enlighten a jury concerning . . . bear spreads, naked calls, and
options on stock index futures will appreciate the time saved in arbitrating before a panel
that already understands the language"). Similarly, arbitration is faster and less costly than
litigation due to limited discovery, the absence of a jury, the limited availability of appeal,
disregard of the rules of evidence, and the informality of procedures such as document
exchange. See id. §§ 4.7-4.9, § 4.12 (explaining that the cost of arbitration is about 40% the
cost of litigation); see, e.g., SHELDON M. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MAR-
KETS: A GUIDE To THE REGULATORY PROCESS § 17.01 (1977) (stating that arbitration
provides cost and time savings advantages due to fewer pretrial motions, limited discovery,
and relaxed rules of evidence); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where are We Going with Gil-
mer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 203, 237-38 (1992) (explaining that the average judicially settled federal civil
rights employment case lasts several months longer than a similar arbitration); FLETCHER,
supra note 4, § 4.6, at 111 (noting that the average arbitration proceeding is approximately
five and one-half months shorter than litigation).
17. Arbitration provides for faster and cheaper resolution of disputes in comparison to
litigation. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 237-38. Additionally, an arbitrator's knowl-
edge or background in securities industry customs and practices can be utilized in his or
her decision-making. Laura R. Hillock, Comment, Arbitration of Title VII and Parallel
State Discrimination Claims: A Proposal, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 182 (1990-91) (noting
that the arbitrator selected may be a technical specialist in the field); see infra notes 156-78
and accompanying text (discussing arbitrators' unique knowledge base).
18. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities
Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1613 (1995) (the employment discrimination panel
discussed that the drafters of the Uniform Code of Arbitration did not specifically intend it
to apply to employment discrimination disputes) [hereinafter Symposium].
19. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) (stating that "it is the
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and
expeditious means for dispute resolution," and noting, conversely, that this characteristic
also makes arbitration "a less appropriate forum [than the courts] for final resolution of"
statutory claims); see Joseph A. Post, Determining Whether to Arbitrate or Litigate, in SE-
CURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, §§ 4.05-.06, at 4-10 to 4-12 (explaining that the pro-
cedural limitations of arbitration are offset by the costs and time savings). Limited
discovery may constrain parties who need to establish key elements in their claim. Id.
§ 4.05, at 4-10. Further, the lack of reasoned, written opinions limits both the collateral
estoppel impact of an award and the "public relations" effect an award has on a brokerage
firm. Id. § 4.06; see also David A. Lipton, Mandatory Securities Industry Arbitration: The
1174 Catholic University Law Review
arbitrator's specific understanding of securities industry practices makes
him or her an attractive intermediary with respect to commercial dis-
putes, the arbitrator's industry knowledge does not necessarily afford an
understanding of current employment laws.2" This trade-off of efficiency,
for the full procedural protections of litigation,2' is considered tolerable
in commercial claims, but has extremely high costs in civil rights employ-
ment claims.22
Problems and the Solution, 48 MD. L. REv. 881, 883 (1989) (explaining that without limita-
tions on the right to appeal arbitration awards, the efficiency of the forum would be
reduced).
20. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743-44 (1981)
(stating that many arbitrators may lack familiarity with the policy considerations underly-
ing federal anti-discrimination statutes, and while arbitrators may be capable of resolving
preliminary factual questions, they may lack the ability to determine ultimate legal issues).
Employment disputes typically involve compensation, training costs, improper termina-
tion, defamation after termination, and the enforceability of non-compete clauses.
MARILYN BLUMBERG CANE & PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PROCEDURE 370 (1991) (stating that the quality of arbitrators is impacted negatively by the
lack of a training prerequisite for acceptance as an arbitrator); see 1994 GAO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 12 (noting that neither the NASD nor NYSE systematically assigns arbitra-
tors to panels based on subject matter expertise). Arbitrator selection is predicated on
affiliation with the securities industry rather than on subject matter expertise. NASD CAP
§ 19(d); see also 1994 GAO Report, supra, at 12. Therefore, the classification of arbitrators
results in only two categories-industry and public. Id. at 5. Industry arbitrators are those
who currently are, or within the last three years were, affiliated with the industry, or are
retirees from a profession where they devoted 20% of their professional time to securities
industry clients. Id. at 5-6. While presumably industry arbitrators have knowledge of the
securities industry, there is no reason to believe their knowledge base encompasses em-
ployment issues. SROs, however, are making an effort to provide arbitrators with current
literature, case law developments, and periodic voluntary training opportunities. SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 1.06[1], at 1-37; see infra notes 156-78 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the importance of arbitrator knowledge in the matter in controversy).
21. Magyar, supra note 3, at 654-55 (explaining that "attendant costs that may be tol-
erable in statutory commercial claims [are] unacceptably high in a statutory civil rights
context"); see SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 4.05, at 4-10 to 4-11 (stating that
the increased efficiency of arbitration is the result of procedural limitations which must be
counterbalanced against the reduction in cost and delay).
22. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) (explaining that the infor-
mality of arbitration enables "it to function as an efficient, inexpensive and expeditious"
forum of dispute resolution for commercial claims and that this is precisely what makes
arbitration a less appropriate forum for statutory claims); see Hillock, supra note 17, at
182-83 (explaining that "where public policy issues like employment discrimination are
concerned" the inherent advantages to arbitration "may become obstacles"). For example,
arbitrators are not required to apply substantive or procedural law, rules of evidence, or
reasons for their decisions. Id. at 183; Magyar, supra note 3, at 654-55 (explaining that the
fundamental characteristics of arbitration inherently curtail statutory safeguards in civil
rights disputes). For example, limited discovery with respect to arbitration of civil rights
employment claims may make them more difficult to prove. Id. at 655; Godsil Cooper,
supra note 16, at 218 (pointing out the difficulty in proving disparate impact without the
benefit of full pre-hearing discovery). Conversely, if claimants were permitted access to
extensive discovery in arbitration, the efficiency of arbitration would be reduced. See Lip-
[Vol. 44:1.169
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The impact of securities arbitration on employment disputes negatively
affects the antidiscrimination policies incorporated in the civil rights stat-
utes because fewer claims can be brought successfully through arbitra-
tion.23 Arbitration both shields civil rights decisions from public
awareness and lacks precedential force in future disputes.2 4 These char-
acteristics prevent securities industry arbitration from advancing the de-
terrent and remedial functions of the civil rights laws.25
This Comment examines the capability of the securities industry's
mandatory arbitration system to protect statutory employment civil
rights. This Comment first traces the historical development of the arbi-
tration of statutory rights and its extension to statutory employment
rights. Second, this Comment examines whether the arbitral forum of the
securities industry is appropriate to resolve statutory employment civil
rights claims. This Comment concludes that given the unique characteris-
tics of securities industry arbitration, this forum is incapable of advancing
the protections and intentions of civil rights laws. This Comment suggests
modifications to the current securities industry arbitration system which
would provide greater safeguards for an employee's civil rights. In the
alternative, this Comment supports the removal of employment disputes
from the securities industry's arbitration arena.
ton, supra note 19, at 883. Similarly, claimant's right of appeal is limited because by con-
tract they forgo litigation to participate in a expeditious and efficient forum; if an
arbitration decision was fully appealable, the efficiency of the arbitration mechanism would
be reduced. Id.; see infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions
between commercial and civil disputes, and concluding that while arbitration is appropriate
to resolve commercial claims, it is a poor adaptation for resolving civil rights and equal
protection claims).
23. See Magyar, supra note 3, at 655 (noting that while Congress intended to protect
the basic right to equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability by enacting civil rights legislation, the arbitration system
procedurally inhibits these protections).
24. Id. (stating that public awareness and public involvement are critical to the deter-
rent and remedial functions of civil rights claims, and without written, reasoned, preceden-
tial, public opinions, the civil rights legislation is inhibited substantively); BLUM3ERG CANE
& SHUB, supra note 20, at 245 (noting that as a result of the 1989 SRO rule changes, most
arbitration awards contain a brief summary of the issues in dispute and sometimes include
specific findings of fact); see also SECURITIES ARBITRATION supra note 6, § 4.04, at 4-8
(explaining that the reduced reliance on precedent in arbitration means that past precedent
will have little effect on current or future claims).
25. Magyar, supra note 3, at 655 (concluding that the discrete nature of arbitration
makes it an inappropriate forum for civil rights cases because the less public awareness a
claim receives the greater probability the problem will continue to be ignored); see
FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 104-05 (noting that arbitration, unlike litigation, remains confi-
dential because the public is excluded from the hearing and the transcript is not a public
record); e.g. NASD CAP § 28 (providing that the arbitrators shall determine the attend-
ance of all persons at a hearing).
19951 1175
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE OVER ARBITRATION
A. The Federal Arbitration Act Creates a Policy Favoring Arbitration
Historically, courts refused to enforce arbitration clauses, viewing them
as second class compared to other contractual provisions.2 6 By this re-
fusal, the judiciary maintained federal jurisdiction over claims and
thereby the ability to implement the policies of federal statutes.27 This
tradition was so firmly embedded in the judicial system that legislation
was needed to overturn it.28 The enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 (FAA) 29 established a federal mandate favoring arbitration,
26. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (pointing out that
the purpose of the FAA was to overrule traditional judicial refusal to enforce arbitration
agreements); see also BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 255 (explaining that
originally "arbitration was 'an unwanted stepchild in the courts,' ... viewed ... as [an]
attempt[ ] to deprive [the courts] of their natural jurisdiction"); Stephen P. Bedell et al.,
The McMahon Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securities and RICO Claims, 19 Loy.
U. CHi. L.J. 1, 1 (1987) (stating that "authorities have accorded arbitration clauses a lesser
status than other contract terms, and have concluded that the judiciary may, in its discre-
tion, refuse to enforce arbitration clauses ... to preserve . . . jurisdiction . . . or to...
implement [policy]").
27. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (requiring a judicial forum to protect the sub-
stantive rights created by the Securities Act of 1933). The Court explained that the "pro-
tective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly
assure their effectiveness." Id. at 437; see BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 255
(stating that the FAA reversed traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration by providing
for faster and more economical resolutions than litigation). The Court subsequently an-
nounced an exception to the Wilko doctrine. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 519-21 (1974) (finding that PDAAs between parties of equal bargaining power and
involving complex international business and legal questions was enforceable with respect
to a claim arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
28. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, Inc., 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). Because the judicial
suspicion of arbitration was so "firmly embedded in the English common law and was
adopted ... by the American courts ... [t]he courts have felt that the precedent was too
strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment." Id. at 220 n.6. This view
prevailed with little new analysis for 20 years. See, e.g., De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co.,
648 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that when it is impracticable "to separate
out nonarbitrable from arbitrable contract claims, a court should deny arbitration in order
to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims") (quoting Miley v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 826-29 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that the Securities
Acts' policies requiring judicial direction to assure their effectiveness outweigh those favor-
ing arbitration); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.) (concluding that arbitration
of a claim arising under the securities laws and Bankruptcy Act could not be compelled),
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
558 F.2d 831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that waivers of the right to judicial trial would
be inconsistent with Congress' overriding concern for the protection of investors in a 1934
Act context).
29. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994)) [hereinafter FAA].
[Vol. 44:1169
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and was instrumental in promoting greater judicial acceptance of contrac-
tual clauses providing for arbitration of future disputes.3"
The FAA provides that a written provision in any contract which re-
quires arbitration of a dispute shall be considered "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" to the same extent as any other contractual provision.3'
The FAA, however, excludes from its coverage some employment con-
tracts.32 The statute further provides that if one party to an arbitration
agreement refuses to comply with its provisions, the other party may peti-
tion a federal court for an order compelling arbitration.33 The statute
leaves the basic arbitration procedures, such as the manner of arbitrator
selection and choice of law, to the parties' discretion. 34 The FAA also
limits judicial review of arbitration awards to situations involving arbitra-
tor misconduct, 35 partiality,36 or abuse of power.37
30. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 and n.32 (1983) (stating that the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments," manifested by this provision and the FAA as a whole, "creates a body of federal
substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate");
see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)
(stating that the FAA mandates a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements")
(quoting Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA makes a written agreement to arbitrate "in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." Id. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 1.01[2], at 1-6 (ex-
plaining that the FAA "places contracts to arbitrate on the same footing as other
contracts").
32. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (excluding "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce").
33. Id. at § 4 (providing that if the formation of the arbitration agreement is not at
issue, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the agreement);
see JAFFE, supra note 16, § 17.02, at 340 (explaining that upon motion, "the court shall stay
trial of the action upon issues that are referable to arbitration and direct that arbitration
proceed" pursuant to the terms of the PDAA).
34. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
35. An order vacating an arbitration award is authorized in any case where arbitrators
refused to "postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause ... or... to hear evidence perti-
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior" prejudicing the rights of
the parties. Id. at § 10(c).
36. Id. at § 10(b) (providing that an actual conflict of interest or appearance of arbitra-
tor bias would be sufficient to vacate an arbitration award); see SECURITIES ARBITRATION,
supra note 6, § 1.05[2], at 1-29 to 1-30 (explaining that an arbitrator must disclose "both
professional and personal relationships with securities industry personnel or firms as well
as with the parties and their counsel"); see NYSE RULES 608 and 610, NASD CAP §§ 21
and 23 (providing that an arbitrator's duty to disclose is ongoing).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 11(b) and (c) (allowing judicial intervention when arbitrators "have
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them" and permitting modification or correction
of an arbitral award that is "imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy"). The more frequently argued judicially created ground for vacating an arbi-
tration award is manifest disregard of the law. SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6,
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Despite the FAA's plain language mandating enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, the federal judiciary has disagreed about the statute's
scope.38 Traditionally, courts exempted certain statutory rights from the
reach of the FAA.3 9 These exemptions resulted primarily from judicial
suspicion of the arbitration process as being an inadequate means of en-
forcing statutory rights.4° Courts concluded that, while arbitration may
be appropriate for contractual rights affecting only the immediate parties,
it was inappropriate for those statutory rights affecting societal public
§ 11.02[2], at 11-16, 11-37; e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (finding that a
manifest disregard of the law requires a clear appearance of disregard, not just a misinter-
pretation of the law).
38. Compare Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628-40 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration clause in a commercial contract even though one
party claimed antitrust violations under the Sherman Act) with Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-55 (1974) (refusing to give preclusive effect to an arbitral
decision involving a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953) (holding that a securities customer's
claims against his broker under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to
arbitration, despite the customer's contractual agreement to arbitrate all future disputes
with his broker). The Wilko Court based its decision on a non-waiver provision of the
Securities Act of 1933 which prohibits agreements waiving compliance with any provision
of the statute. Id. at 434-35. The Securities Act of 1933 grants plaintiffs the right to seek
enforcement of the civil liability provision, § 12(2), in any state or federal court with juris-
diction. Id. at 431; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (1994) (creating a private cause of action). In
addition, the Court doubted the capacity of the arbitration process to enforce the statutory
rights Congress created by enacting § 12(2). Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437; see also Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1981) (exempting a Fair Labor Standards
Act claim from arbitration); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-93 (1984)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreements that encompassed claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)).
40. The Court in Wilko stated four concerns with arbitration determinations: arbitra-
tors make them without instruction on the law; arbitral awards may be made without a
written, reasoned explanation; an arbitrators' conception of the legal standard applied can-
not be examined; and there is limited opportunity for judicial review of arbitral decisions.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37; see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743 (stating that many arbitra-
tors may not be familiar with the policy considerations underlying federal statutes and
while arbitrators may be capable of resolving preliminary factual questions, they may lack
the ability to determine ultimate legal issues); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58. The Court
explained various concerns it had with the arbitration process: the "specialized competence
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land"; the
factfinding process in arbitration is not comparable to judicial factfinding; the arbitration
record is not as complete as a judicial record; "the usual rules of evidence do not apply";
and the procedures used in civil trials, such as the discovery process, are limited or unavail-
able. Id. at 57-58. Statutory claims involve enforcement of laws designed to protect socie-
tal interests which create a public interest in their outcome as compared with contractual
claims which generally affect only the parties to the contract. See id. at 57. See generally
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1985) (explaining that the FAA
was designed to overcome judicial hostility towards arbitration); Magyar, supra note 3, at
642-43 (distinguishing statutory claims from contract claims). Courts typically favor en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate contractual claims more so than statutory claims. Id.
at 643.
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policy. 4' The courts felt such statutory rights should be reserved for
judicial resolution.42 Thus, a public policy exception to the FAA de-
veloped.43
This public policy exception began to crumble in the early 1980s as the
Supreme Court's confidence in the arbitration process grew." Since
then, the Court consistently has upheld compulsory arbitration of statu-
tory commercial claims pursuant to the FAA.45 Until Gilmer in 1991,
however, the Court had refused to uphold arbitration agreements involv-
ing statutory civil rights claims.'
41. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56 (remarking that while arbitration is well-suited to
contractual claims it is comparatively inappropriate for the resolution of statutory claims).
42. See Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of
the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 482 (1981) (stating courts have found
that "where an issue [is] of strong public policy, usually derived from statute ... the matter
must be considered by a court and not decided finally by arbitrators"). For example, fed-
eral and state courts have refused to enforce arbitration agreements with respect to anti-
trust laws, patent laws, and child custody disputes. Id.
43. E.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. 437-38 (requiring a judicial forum to protect the substantive
rights created by the Securities Act of 1933); BLUMBERO CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at
255-56 (explaining that the FAA conflicted with the protective provisions of the securities
laws which provided for judicial resolution of claims because of the public concern over the
disparity in bargaining power between buyers and sellers); Sterk, supra note 42, at 483
(stating that statutory rights effecting societal public policy can override the FAA's man-
date for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate).
44. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983) (holding that the FAA establishes that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbi-
trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration"); Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20 (pointing
out that the purpose of the FAA was to overrule traditional judicial refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 636-40 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration clause in a commercial contract arising
under antitrust violations of the Sherman Act).
45. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1989) (holding Exchange Act claims arbitrable); Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (holding both the 1934 Act and Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims arbitrable in a domestic dispute). Once
a party agrees to arbitrate, the agreement should be enforced unless a congressional intent
to preclude arbitration is shown. Id. at 237-38.
46. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing an agree-
ment to arbitrate with respect to a statutory ADEA claim); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60
(refusing to give preclusive effect to an arbitral decision involving a statutory Title VII
claim); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (holding that
arbitration decisions under the FLSA would not be given preclusive effect); McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-93 (1984) (refusing to give preclusive effect to an
arbitration award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see infra notes 47-93 (discussing the history of
arbitration prior to Gilmer).
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B. The Court's Treatment of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Diverges into Two Lines of Cases
The growth of securities arbitration has developed in tandem with
changes in the law regarding the enforcement of PDAAs.47 Gilmer rep-
resented the Supreme Court's first attempt to reconcile the distinct na-
ture of discrimination claims arising under collective bargaining PDAAs
with PDAAs arising under commercial statutory claims.48 Determining
how these two lines of precedent intersect is crucial in understanding the
Court's jurisprudence regarding the arbitrability of discrimination claims
arising under mandatory PDAAs.49
1. Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Collective Bargaining
Agreements
At first, a line of cases involving labor disputes subject to arbitration
pursuant to PDAAs contained in collective bargaining agreements devel-
oped.5" When the issue of arbitrability of statutory claims arose in the
collective bargaining context, the Court completely disregarded.the FAA.
Instead, the Court decided the issue entirely under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),51 the statutory authority for
labor arbitration.52 Rejecting arbitration of these federal statutory
47. SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, § 1.01[2], at 1-6. "[T]he number of arbi-
tration cases administered under the Uniform Code increased ... from 830 cases in 1980 to
5332 cases in 1990-reflect[ing] the growing acceptance of arbitration in Congress and in
the courts during the twentieth century .... Id.
48. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 201 (4th Cir.) (repre-
senting the second appellate attempt to reconcile the Alexander and Mitsubishi lines and
holding that a PDAA to arbitrate all employment claims encompassed an ADEA claim),
cert. granted in part, 498 U.S. 809 (1990), and aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991); cf. Nicholson v.
CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1989) (representing the first appellate attempt to
reconcile the Alexander and Mitsubishi lines and holding a PDAA is not enforceable for an
ADEA claim). The split in the courts implied that neither line of cases is obviously
controlling.
49. Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 104 HARV. L. REV. 568, 577 (1990) (explaining that the employment cases con-
trast sharply with the commercial cases in that the Court refused to enforce PDAAs in its
employment decisions).
50. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60 (refusing to give preclusive effect to an arbitral
decision involving a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Barrentine, 450
U.S. at 745 (holding that judicial claims under Fair Labor Standards Act were not barred
even if first arbitrated); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292 (refusing to grant res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel affect to an arbitral award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which would have barred
petitioner's action).
51. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-120,
61 Stat. 156, 156-57, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
52. See General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547,548 (1957)
(holding "that § 301 furnishes a body of federal substantive law [to] enforce[ ] collective
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claims, these decisions exemplified a clear distrust for the ability of arbi-
tration to vindicate individual statutory rights.53
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,54 a case involving a Title VII 5 claim,
a unanimous Supreme Court held that the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory em-
ployment practices could be reconciled best by allowing the plaintiff to
pursue a remedy under both the arbitration clause of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and Title VII.56
The Court based its holding on three factors. First, the Court found
that Title VII's enforcement mechanism, managed by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),57 would be jeopardized if the
bargaining agreements in industries in commerce or affecting commerce ..."); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (finding that courts can enforce
arbitration agreements based on a federal policy to promote industrial stabilization
through the collective bargaining agreement); see also G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other
Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"
for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 511-13 (1990) (noting the Court's preference for
analyzing collective bargaining arbitration under § 301 of the LMRA, rather than under
the FAA).
53. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-60; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742-45 (highlighting weak-
nesses in the arbitration system); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91 (reiterating prior conclu-
sions regarding the capability of the arbitration process when compared to judicial
resolution); see infra part II (discussing the arbitration system's inadequacies in resolving
statutory claims).
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
55. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982) (prohib-
iting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin). Alexander alleged that Gardner-Denver had discriminated against him on the ba-
sis of race. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42. Upon termination for production of defective parts,
Alexander filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement in force between
the company and the union. Id. at 38-39. His claim was processed according to the broad
arbitration clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 40-42. The arbi-
trator, ruling without reference to the racial discrimination allegation, found that Alexan-
der had been discharged for just cause. Id. at 42-43. After receiving a right to sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Alexander sued Gard-
ner-Denver in federal court. Id. at 43.
56. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60 (concluding that Congress intended victims of em-
ployment discrimination to have overlapping judicial and administrative remedies for Title
VII violations). The Court qualified its holding, however, by suggesting that a court has
discretion to admit arbitral findings "as evidence" in a Title VII trial. Id. at 60.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (outlining the role of the EEOC). See 1994 GAO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining the functions of the EEOC). The EEOC enforces
the basic right to equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability as guaranteed in federal legislation, such as The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990. Id. The EEOC receives and investigates charges of employ-
ment discrimination against private sector employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC
will dismiss a charge after its investigation and examination if: (1) on its face, the charge
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claims were arbitrated.58 Second, the Court held that individual employ-
ees have a private right of action to bring statutory claims in addition to
rights granted under collective bargaining agreements. 9 Finally, the
Court questioned the capability of arbitrators to enforce statutory
rights. 60 The Court emphasized that arbitrators cannot remedy the socie-
tal problems that statutes such as Title VII address, because they have no
general authority to invoke laws that counteract with collective bargain-
ing agreements.6 ' Similarly, the Court found that although arbitration
procedures were well suited to resolving contractual disputes, they were
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII
rights.62
fails to state a claim under Title VII; (2) the charging party fails to cooperate with the
EEOC in obtaining information; (3) the EEOC cannot locate the charging party after rea-
sonable effort; (4) the charge is not timely filed; (5) the charging party refuses to accept
from the employer a settlement offer which the EEOC determines is adequate to remedy
the charge; or (6) after investigation of the charge, the EEOC finds no reasonable cause to
believe the charge of discrimination is true. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.18(a-f) & 1601.19(a). If the
EEOC finds cause to believe the charge is true it will try to eliminate the discriminatory
practice by engaging in "conference, conciliation, and persuasion" with the employer. Id.
§ 1601.24. Remedies may include reinstatement, back pay, or an award of damages to
compensate for actual monetary loss. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). If conciliation attempts fail,
the EEOC may either initiate a civil suit on behalf of the grievant or issue a right-to-sue
notice which entitles the party to sue in federal court. Id. §§ 1601.18(e) & 1601.19(a).
58. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44-45. Title VII does not provide the EEOC with direct
powers of enforcement, rather final responsibility for enforcement remains with the federal
courts under their broad remedial powers. Id. at 44 (stating that the "[EEOC] cannot
adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions. Rather .... [Title VII] authorizes
courts to issue injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action . . .appropriate to
remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices").
59. Id. at 49-50 (stating, "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and stat-
utory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence"). The Court explained that, because Congress thought-it necessary to provide
a judicial forum for ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims under Title
VII, the judicial forum should remain available. Id. at 44-45.
60. Id. at 56-57 (noting that the arbitrator's sole source of authority was the collective
bargaining agreement, which must be interpreted and applied to the facts).
61. Id. at 53-54 (concluding that the parameters of the collective bargaining agreement
hinder an arbitrator's effectiveness in vindicating rights protected by Title VII because an
arbitrator is confined to interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement which is
solely a contractual interpretation). The Court added that the arbitrator's award must
draw "its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 53.
62. Id. at 56. Typically, parties choose an arbitrator because they trust his or her
knowledge and judgment with respect to the norms of industrial relations, customs and
practices, not his or her familiarity with Title VII. Id. at 57 (explaining that arbitrator
expertise "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land"). Conversely,
judicial interpretation of statutory and constitutional issues belongs to the courts as the
broad language of statutes such as Title VII can only be given meaning by reference to
public law concepts typically not within the arbitrators' expertise. Id.; see supra note 20
(explaining that many arbitrators may not be familiar with the policy considerations under-
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The Court extended Alexander in Barrentine v. Arkansas Freight Sys-
tem, Inc.,63 holding that an arbitration decision, rendered pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement, did not preclude judicial resolution of a
statutory violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).6 The
Court distinguished rights arising out of the arbitration provision of the
collective bargaining agreement and rights arising out of the FLSA.65
The Court found that individual employee rights which are not based on
a collective bargaining agreement should be vindicated in a judicial fo-
rum.66 In support of its holding, the Court echoed Alexander's attack on
the capability of the arbitration process to resolve employees' statutory
rights.67
The Court unanimously reaffirmed the Alexander and Barrentine hold-
ings in McDonald v. City of West Branch .68 The Court held that in a
lying federal statutes, and while arbitrators may be capable of resolving preliminary factual
questions, they may lack the ability to determine ultimate legal issues).
63. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). Barrentine and fellow employees filed a series of grievances
alleging that they were not compensated for overtime, despite the collective bargaining
agreement that required compensation "for all time spent in ... service." Id. at 731 n.3
(quoting the collective bargaining agreement). Their grievances were rejected without ex-
planation, and Barrentine filed a subsequent action in federal court under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at 731-33.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) (providing that employees are permitted to bring statu-
tory wage and hour claims "in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction"). The
Court stated that the FLSA is intended to protect individual employees from substandard
wages, oppressive working hours, detrimental working conditions, and to provide a judicial
forum for its enforcement. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739, 745. The Court noted that the
FLSA is distinguished from the purpose of the LMRA, which offers protection to employ-
ees collectively. Id. at 739.
65. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737-38 (disagreeing with respondent's attempt to distin-
guish Alexander on the basis that the FLSA dispute arose under a subject inherent to the
collective bargaining process). The dissenting Justices did not believe that parties were
precluded from agreeing to binding arbitration of disputes under the FLSA. Id. at 746-47
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating, "[t]he existence of a right and the provision of a judicial
forum do not necessarily make either nonwaivable").
66. Id. at 745. The Court expressed concern that employee rights under the FLSA
might be lost if submitted to arbitration because the union has a collective objective-
maximization of overall compensation-not necessarily the maximization of compensa-
tion for an individual. Id. at 742. Wage and hour disputes are processed by the union, not
the individual, and therefore, even if the claim is valid, the union does not have to support
the arbitration claim if it would not benefit the group as a whole. Id. A union may sacri-
fice an individual employee's statutorily granted wage and hour benefits if another expen-
diture of their resources could result in greater benefit to the entire bargaining unit. Id.
67. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-45 (highlighting weaknesses such as an arbitrator's lack
of competence in dealing with public law considerations underlying a federal statute, and
the confinement of an arbitrator's interpretation to the terms of the contractual collective
bargaining agreement as a means of effectuating the intent of the parties and determining
the types of relief that can be awarded).
68. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). McDonald, discharged from his police officer position, filed a
grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement in force between the City of
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§ 198369 action, a federal court should not give preclusive effect to an
arbitration award brought pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.7" In light of the reasoning of Alexander and Barrentine, and
the arbitration process' inadequacies, the Court maintained that arbitra-
tion cannot adequately safeguard federal statutory and constitutional
rights. 71
2. Commercial Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Following Alexander and its progeny, the Supreme Court addressed the
arbitrability of statutory claims in a competing line of commercial cases.
72
The Court rejected traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration in favor of
the FAA's policy calling for strict enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate.7 3
West Branch and the union, alleging that there was "no proper cause" for his discharge.
Id. at 285-86. At arbitration, the arbitrator found just cause for the discharge. Id. With-
out appealing, McDonald filed a § 1983 action against the City of West Branch in district
court. Id. The city contended that the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1988), required the court to give preclusive effect to the arbitration award. Mc-
Donald, 466 U.S. at 287. The Full Faith and Credit provision provides, "[sluch Acts,
records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have ... in the...
State." Id. at 388 n.6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally passed as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides
that every person who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional
right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (stating that § 1983 purports to deter state actors
from using "their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and
to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails").
70. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91 (maintaining that the implementation of a preclu-
sive effect to the arbitration award would likely eliminate the protection of federal rights
the statute is intended to provide).
71. Id. at 290-91. The Court reiterated its prior conclusions regarding the capability of
the arbitration process: an arbitrator may not have the requisite expertise to resolve legal
questions; an arbitrator's authority is limited to the parameters of the collective bargaining
contract; the union has control over the presentation of an employee's grievance; factfind-
ing by arbitrators is not comparable to judicial factfinding; and the union's interest is the
collective interest, which is not necessarily the same as the individual's. Id.
72. The commercial cases were not employment related. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (claiming antitrust violations
under the Sherman Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (claiming violations of federal securities acts and RICO violations); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (alleging federal securities
acts violations).
73. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-29 (enforcing an arbitration clause in a commercial
contract even though one party claimed antitrust violations under the Sherman Act); Mc-
Mahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242 (enforcing arbitration agreements when violations of RICO
and the securities acts were alleged); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479-81 (enforcing
arbitration agreements when violations of the 1934 Act were alleged).
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In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,7" the
Court upheld a compulsory arbitration agreement for an antitrust claim
arising in an international context.75 The Court explained that absent an
explicit exception in the FAA or an express Congressional intent disfa-
voring arbitration,76 international policy concerns required enforcement
of the arbitration agreement.77 The Court rejected the argument that the
remedial function of the antitrust statute 78 would not be realized and held
that as long as an individual vindicates his or her statutory rights in the
arbitral forum, the statute would continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent functions.79 Finally, the Court, relying on its substantive review
power80 at the award enforcement stage, concluded that the antitrust
claim was arbitrable.8'
74. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
75. Id. at 638-40 (asserting a cause of action under the Sherman Act). The arbitration
agreement provided for the resolution of all disputes in Japan pursuant to the rules of the
Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. at 617. Mitsubishi alleged a breach of
the Sales Agreement and brought an action to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA and
to the broad arbitration provision in the agreement. Id. at 618-19. Soler denied those
allegations and countered with antitrust claims, which Soler argued could not be arbitrated.
Id. at 619-20.
76. Id. at 627-28 (explaining that while the FAA favors arbitration, the court must
consider express congressional intent with respect to any claims as to which arbitration
agreements should be held unenforceable). The dissent argued that the express statutory
remedy of the Sherman Act provides the requisite congressional intent that antitrust claims
were not meant to be administered by an arbitrator. Id. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 629 (expressing that the need for predictability in the resolution of interna-
tional commercial disputes requires enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate). The
Court rejected the assertion that the complexity of an issue alone is sufficient to bar arbi-
tration, rather it is a factor that the parties should consider when selecting arbitrators and
determining the arbitral rules. Id. at 633 (explaining that "adaptability and access to ex-
pertise are hallmarks of arbitration," therefore, arbitration can respond specifically to com-
plex issues by empaneling experts).
78. Id. at 635-36 (arguing that the antitrust laws are designed to promote the public
interest in a competitive economy, therefore, an antitrust claim is not just a private matter).
A treble damages provision within the antitrust laws measures the award to be provided by
a multiple of the injury actually proved, and is effective in both deterring and penalizing
antitrust violations. Id. at 635 (finding that a private remedy "does not compel the conclu-
sion that it may not be sought outside an American court").
79. Id. at 636-37 (focusing on adaptability of arbitration, the Court explained that a
party may provide in advance for a procedure to seek antitrust recovery).
80. Id. at 638 (recognizing that "it would not require intrusive inquiry [by the court] to
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided
them").
81. Id. Because the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Rules require arbitrators to
state the rationale for the award, unless the parties agree otherwise, a court may substan-
tively review an arbitrator's decision. Id. at 638 n.20.
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In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,82 the Court enforced a
PDAA arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act83 and under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO)8 4 in a domestic transaction thereby eroding further its traditional
suspicion of the arbitral process' ability to vindicate statutory rights.85
Relying on the FAA, the Court devised, with respect to statutory claims,
a rebuttable presumption of enforceability for PDAAs; that presumption
can be refuted in several ways: (1) an express textual prohibition of arbi-
tration in a statute; (2) legislative history indicating intent to prohibit ar-
bitration; or, (3) an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's
underlying goals.86 Absent proof of such an intent, the McMahon Court
held that a PDAA was unenforceable only when arbitration is found inca-
pable of adequately enforcing statutory rights.87 Because the Commis-
sion approved the arbitration procedures, the Court concluded that
82. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The McMahons individually and jointly signed a series of
customer agreements with Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. (Shearson), a registered bro-
ker-dealer. Id. at 222-23. Each customer agreement contained a PDAA for any contro-
versy relating to the McMahons' accounts at Shearson. Id. at 223. Alleging that their
broker violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act by engaging in excessive trading, making
false statements, and omitting material facts from advice, the McMahons filed suit in the
district court. Id. Shearson moved to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to the
PDAA in the customer agreement and § 3 of the FAA. Id.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
85. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242 (upholding an agreement to arbitrate claims arising
under the 1934 Securities Act and RICO).
86. Id. at 226-28 (explaining that the FAA mandates arbitration unless "overridden by
a contrary congressional command"). The opponent of arbitration has the burden of prov-
ing that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of the judicial forum. Id. at 227. The
McMahons argued that § 29(a) of the 1934 Act, a provision forbidding the waiver ofcom-
pliance with a statutory duty (waiver of a judicial forum), prohibits the weakening of their
recovery and should be grounds for voiding the PDAA. Id. at 227-31. Using the congres-
sional intent standard, the Court found nothing in the language of the RICO statute or its
legislative history to bar RICO claims from the reach of the FAA. Id. at 238-39. Similarly,
the Court failed to find an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and RICO's purpose.
Id.; see also Note, supra note 49, at 577 (maintaining that the McMahon Court asserted
that "unless Congress expresses an intent to preclude arbitration, arbitration agreements
are enforceable").
87. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-35 (limiting the Wilko decision). The Wilko decision
was based on a mistrust of the arbitration process, which the Court found was no longer
legitimate. Id. at 233. At the time of Wilko, "the Commission had only limited authority
over the rules governing ... SROs," including the national exchanges and NASD. Id.
Since the 1975 amendments to § 19 of the 1934 Act, the Commission's oversight authority
has expanded "to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs." Id. The Commission has the power to "'abrogate, add to, and delete from' any
SRO rule ... to further the objectives of the [1934] Act." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)).
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PDAAs do not result inherently in a waiver of the statutory protections
of the securities laws.88
The Court went a step further in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express,89 when it expressly overruled the traditional view that
the securities acts require a judicial forum to ensure their effective appli-
cation.90 The Court stated that, to the extent the traditional view relied
on a suspicion of arbitration as a means of weakening statutory protec-
tions, the view is outmoded in comparison with the current endorsement
of arbitral resolutions of statutory claims.91 Further, the inconsistency
between the traditional view and McMahon undermined the harmonious
construction of the federal securities laws, which are supposed to fall
under a single regulatory scheme.92 As a result, the Court overruled the
traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration and reinforced the mandate to
strictly enforce PDAAs pursuant to the FAA.93
88. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234. Because the Commission has sufficient statutory au-
thority to ensure that 1934 Act rights are vindicated, enforcement of a PDAA "does not
effect a waiver of 'compliance with any provision' " of the 1934 Act under section 29(a).
Id. at 238. The dissent condemned the majority for embracing the arbitral forum at a of
apparent industry abuses towards investors. Id. at 243 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting the inadequacies of arbitration, such as limited judicial re-
view, no requirement for written rationales, and control of the arbitration forum by the
securities industry).
89. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The claim arose from a signed standard customer agreement
with Shearson that contained a PDAA. Id. at 478-79. The couple alleged that their broker
made unauthorized and fraudulent transactions in their account and subsequently brought
a claim for violations of § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the 1934
Act. Id.
90. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 237-38 (refusing to extend Wilko to the Exchange Act);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (requiring a judicial forum to protect the substantive
rights created by the Securities Act of 1933). The Wilko Court explained that the "protec-
tive provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly as-
sure their effectiveness." Id. at 437.
91. Compare Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37 (resting its suspicion of the arbitral process on
the fact that it fails to provide for judicial instruction on the law or judicial review of errors
in interpretation and fails to provide records or a written opinion) with Rodriguez de
Quijas, Inc., 490 U.S. at 480-81 (finding a steady erosion of the old judicial hostility to-
wards arbitration over the years); see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining
that the current oversight role of the Commission provides for vindication of statutory
rights in the arbitration forum).
92. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480-81 (explaining that Rodriguez' claims under the 1934
Act would be arbitrable according to McMahon, while the 1933 Act claim would not be
subject to arbitration pursuant to the traditional view of Wilko).
93. Id. at 484. The majority explained that although the Court is generally reluctant to
overrule prior decisions construing statutes, it had done so in the past "to achieve a uni-
form interpretation of similar statutory language ... to correct a seriously erroneous inter-
pretation of statutory language that would undermine congressional policy as expressed in
other legislation." Id. (citation omitted). The Court maintained that both of these pur-
poses would be served by overruling Wilko. Id,
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3. Differences Between Collective Bargaining and Commercial
Arbitration Justify the Divergent Treatment
There are two potential explanations for the apparent conflict between
th6 Alexander and the Mitsubishi lines of cases.94 First, evidence of con-
gressional intent applying the FAA to employment claims is sparse.95 For
example, the Alexander line refers to the LMRA, not the FAA, as the
federal policy mandating arbitration of labor disputes.96 Second, the na-
ture of commercial arbitration differs from that of collective bargaining.97
In a commercial case, claimants usually have signed a contract agreeing to
arbitrate disputes.98 For example, arbitration clauses are included in the
contract between a brokerage firm and its customers.99 This scenario dif-
fers from the collective bargaining relationship, where the union negoti-
ates and signs the arbitration clause on behalf of its members. 100 In the
collective bargaining context, an organization, such as a union, controls
the resolution of the dispute.' 0 ' Unlike collective bargaining, claimants
in commercial arbitration personally control the decision to proceed with
a claim and select representation sufficient for their interests. 10 2
C. Reconciliation of the Court's Arbitration Cases: The Arbitrability of
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Claims
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.103 represented the Supreme
Court's first attempt to harmonize the Mitsubishi pro-arbitration cases'
°4
94. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (explaining that the conflict between
the Alexander and Mitsubishi lines is based on the distinction between their collective bar-
gaining and commercial natures).
95. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (suggesting an exemption for some or all employment
contracts).
96. This distinction is noted in Note, supra note 49, at 578 (the federal policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes lies in § 301 of the LMRA). See Shell, supra note 52, at 512-
13 (explaining the Court's preference for analyzing collective bargaining arbitration under
§ 301 of the LMRA, rather than under the FAA).
97. Shell, supra note 52, at 531.
98. Id.
99. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. "Broker-dealer firms may require [pro-
spective] investors, as a condition of doing business with the firm, to agree to use arbitra-
tion to resolve any ... disputes between the investor and the firm." Id.
100. Shell, supra note 52, at 531.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
104. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (en-
forcing PDAAs for possible violations of the 1934 Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing PDAAs for possible violations of the Securi-
ties Acts and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (enforcing a PDAA in a commercial contract despite allegations of antitrust
violations under the Sherman Act).
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with the Alexander collective bargaining cases. 105 The claimant in Gilmer
formulated his position based on the collective bargaining cases10 6 con-
tending that an ADEA claim,1" 7 could not be resolved adequately in arbi-
tration because the rights protected by the statute deserve the safeguards
and public notice of the judicial forum.10 8 Conversely, Interstate formu-
lated its demand for arbitration on the commercial line of cases that en-
forced PDAAs pursuant to the FAA.109 Because the Mitsubishi line of
cases allowed the arbitration of statutory claims and the Alexander line
did not, the Court in Gilmer was forced to address the interplay between
the FAA and the collective bargaining cases.110
The Court held that the commercial line of decisions applies to PDAAs
for statutory employment claims of discrimination, while the Alexander
line applies only in the collective bargaining context.11 Under the FAA,
105. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (refusing to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements that encompassed claims under § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (refusing to enforce a PDAA arising under the
FLSA); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (refusing to give preclusive
effect to an arbitral decision involving a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). Compare Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (the first appel-
late attempt to reconcile the Alexander and Mitsubishi lines and holding that a PDAA is
not enforceable for an ADEA claim) with Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 895
F.2d 195 (4th Cir.) (the second appellate attempt to reconcile the Alexander and Mitsubishi
lines and holding that a PDAA to arbitrate all employment claims included an ADEA
claim), cert. granted, in part, 498 U.S. 809 (1990), and aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
106. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34 (finding Gilmer's reliance on Alexander and its prog-
eny misplaced because they occurred in the context of a collective bargaining agreement).
107. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
108. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29. The claimant raised familiar challenges to the adequacy of
arbitral procedures including: biased arbitrator panels, limited discovery, lack of written
opinions, limited judicial review, limited range of relief, and inequality of bargaining
power. Id. at 30-33. Gilmer made no showing that the NYSE discovery provisions were
insufficient. Id. at 31. Further, any limitations on discovery are compensated for by re-
laxed rules of evidence. See NYSE RULE 620 (providing that arbitrators are not bound by
the rules of evidence). The NYSE rules do require written arbitration awards, although
arbitrators are not required to provide a written rationale. See id. at 627 (mandating that
awards contain the names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a
description of the award issued). Further, unequal bargaining power is not sufficient to
void a PDAA, whereas a showing of fraud or overwhelming economic power would be.
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. Gilmer made no showing of fraud. Id.
109. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. The district court, relying on Alexander, denied Inter-
state's motion. Id. The court of appeals reversed using the McMahon standard, which
states nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indi-
cated a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id.
110. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 207.
111. Id.; see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. The first distinction was that the Alexander line
did not involve statutory claims, but rather the preclusion of subsequent resolution of stat-
utory claims. Id. at 35. Second, the Alexander line dealt with a collective bargaining
agreement where representation was focused on the collective rather than individual statu-
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PDAAs must be enforced unless Congress intended to preclude waiver of
the judicial remedy.112 Applying the McMahon three-prong analysis," 13
the Court examined the text, legislative history, and purposes of the
ADEA.114 Because the ADEA legislative history and text are silent on
the issue, the focal point of the debate became McMahon's incompatibil-
ity test-determining whether the ADEA's purpose conflicts with an ar-
bitral resolution of those arbitration claims."' The Court was
unpersuaded by the argument that the framework Congress established
for the ADEA, which provided for EEOC oversight and enforcement,
should preclude arbitration." 6 The Court also dismissed Gilmer's argu-
ment that compulsory arbitration deprived claimants of the judicial forum
the ADEA provides." 7
tory rights. Id. Finally, the Court distinguished the two lines based on its reliance on the
LMRA versus the FAA, which reflects a policy favoring arbitration agreements. Id. The
strongest of these reasons for the Court's refusal to follow Alexander and its progeny lies in
the collective bargaining context. Note, supra note 49, at 579-80 (noting that the Court in
Alexander recognized the divergence of the interests of the individual with that of the
union's).
112. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 207-08.
113. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (outlining the McMahon standard
for determining the arbitrability of statutory claims).
114. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 26-29 (finding neither the text, legislative history, nor social
policies furthered by the ADEA recognize an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
ADEA's underlying purpose). Thomas H. Stewart, Note, Arbitrating Claims Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990), 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1432-33
(1991) (stating, "[b]ecause the FAA creates a strong presumption of arbitrability, the party
opposing arbitration carries the burden of proving that ... congressional intent ... pre-
clude[s] the arbitration of ADEA rights").
115. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
116. Id. at 27 (noting that it "[did] not perceive any inherent inconsistency between
[ADEA's] policies.., and enforcing agreements to arbitrate [ADEA] claims"). The Court
also rejected the argument that arbitration would impact negatively on the ability of the
EEOC to enforce the ADEA, because the EEOC is not dependent on individuals to file
charges before it can act. Id. at 28. It may receive information " 'from any source,' and it
has independent authority to investigate age discrimination." Id. In addition, the Court
stated that "mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute
is not sufficient to preclude arbitration." Id. at 28-29.
117. Id. at 29. Although the Court noted that the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act amended the ADEA to ensure that rights and claims were not waived unless such
waiver was knowing and voluntary, the Court stated that Congress did not explicitly pre-
clude arbitration. Id. at 28-29. "'[I1f Congress intended the substantive protection af-
forded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum,
that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.' " Id. (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
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II. THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION FORUM AND THE
RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
A. The Self-Regulatory Organization's Role in the Arbitration Process
Prior to the development of the current system, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) left the task of investor dispute resolution to
individual self-regulatory organizations (SROs). 118 In 1976, the SEC,
through its public rulemaking process, initiated the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA), a group composed of SRO represent-
atives, the Securities Industry Association and several public representa-
tives.' 19 SICA expanded the existing rules of SROs and developed the
first version of the Uniform Code of Arbitration (Code).12 ° The Code
provides for a uniform system of dispute resolution for small claims in the
securities industry12' and arbitration procedures covering all disputes be-
118. Deborah Masucci & Edward W. Morris, Jr., Securities Arbitration at Self-Regula-
tory Organizations: Administration and Procedures, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1988 309,
313 (1988). The NYSE Constitution of 1817 required all disputes to be resolved by a ma-
jority of the exchanges Board. The NYSE permitted arbitration between non-members
and members in 1872, between members in 1935, and in places other than New York by
1939. Id. The NASD adopted its Code of Procedure in 1968. Id.; see also Mark D. Fit-
terman, Catherine McGuire & Robert A. Love, The SEC and SRO Arbitration, in ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 106-63 (1992) (outlining the
evolution of current SRO arbitration programs).
119. SICA REPORT #5, at 2-3 (Apr. 1986) (discussing the proposal of a task force to
consider the development of "a uniform arbitration code and the means for establishing a
more efficient, economic and appropriate mechanism for resolving" disputes between bro-
kers, dealers and customers at SROs). The first conference was composed of representa-
tives of:
[T]he American, Boston, Cincinnati, Midwest, New York, Pacific and Philadel-
phia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Municipal Se-
curities Rulemaking Board, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
the Securities Industry Association and three representatives of the public - Pe-
ter R. Celia, Jr., Mortimer Goodman and Professor Constantine N. Katsoris ....
A fourth public member, Justin P. Klein, was added to the Conference in 1983.
Id. at 3. Today, members of the Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and the North American Se-
curities Administrators Association (NASAA) also are invited to attend the conference.
SICA REPORT #8, at 1 (1994). "SICA's original mandate was to develop rules for the
resolution of disputes involving small claims. Over time, SICA assumed responsibility for
formulating uniform arbitration rules for all securities SROs." 1992 GAO REPORT, supra
note 10, at 15 n.2; see also Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities
Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 284 (1984) (stating that the Code establishes a uniform
standard of procedure to be applied for all claims in the securities industry).
120. SICA REPORT # 5, at 3-4 (explaining that the Code incorporated and harmonized
pre-existing individual SRO rules and provided for arbitration of disputes between broker/
dealers and customers).
121. Id. at 2 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,528, dated June 9, 1976).
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tween customers and broker/dealers.122 The participating SROs adopted
the code, with only minor variations, throughout 1979 and 1980 and it is
amended periodically in SICA meetings. 123 As a result, various SROs
have adopted similar arbitration rules amongst themselves. 24 Through
its oversight authority, the Commission regulates the SROs, and there-
fore these arbitration processes, 125 in order to advance the objectives of
the securities laws.' 26 The SROs, however, retain control over the admin-
istration of the arbitration forum and are subsidized by their broker/
dealer member firms.'1 2
7
The Commission's oversight of the securities industry's arbitration pro-
gram focuses on customer/firm disputes, as opposed to intra-industry em-
ployment disputes, such as discrimination claims.128 Commission officials
comment that discrimination cases are not a priority because, as the Com-
122. Id. at 3-4 (explaining that SICA developed a comprehensive Code and explana-
tory booklets describing both small claims and regular arbitration procedures). Originally,
small customer claims included those less than $2,500. Id. at 3. Currently, the cutoff is
$10,000. SICA REPORT #8, at 1. Resolution of a small claim can be based on the pleadings
alone in lieu of a full hearing. Id.
123. SICA REPORT #5, at 4. The Code was adopted by the SROs pursuant to § 19 and
Rule 19b-4 of the 1934 Act, as amended. SICA REPORT #8 at 1. Many changes were made
after the McMahon decision to provide parties with rights they would have had in litigation
without forgoing the efficiency and economy of arbitration. Id.; see supra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text (explaining the reasoning behind McMahon). Current amendment
considerations include "the availability of punitive damages, representation in arbitration
by non-attorneys, eligibility of claims for arbitration, form of pleadings, criteria for chal-
lenges for cause, and qualification and education of arbitrators." SICA REPORT #8, at 1.
124. Shell, supra note 52, at 535.
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a) (1994) (providing specific procedural requirements); see
also 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. The Commission has "broad authority to
oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes, in-
cluding the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that
arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." William A. Gregory & Wil-
liam J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration: A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV.
1223, 1247 (1993) (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34).
126. Gregory & Schneider, supra note 125, at 1247 (stating that as a result of its over-
sight authority, the Commission can act more quickly than Congress or state legislatures to
correct any inefficiencies in the securities industry). The Commission has the power to
"abrogate, add to, and delete from" SRO rules. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)). The
Commission has to notify the SRO, publish notice of the proposed amendment in the Fed-
eral Register, and hold a public hearing for comment. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(1) (1994); see
also Fitterman, McGuire & Love, supra note 118, at 161 (explaining that the Commission
is able to modify rules necessary to promote the fair administration of the SRO and con-
form to the federal securities laws).
127. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
128. Id. at 3 (examining the oversight role of the Commission with respect to the SRO
arbitration programs). The Report notes that Commission inspections focus on customer-
firm disputes rather than discrimination disputes. Id. at 13. As a result, the Commission
has no information on the efficiency or effectiveness of SRO processing of discrimination
disputes. Id.
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mission interprets the 1934 Act, the Commission's primary responsibility
is consumer protection.' 29 Commission staff have acknowledged that
mandatory arbitration is final and binding upon registered representa-
tives, and decisions may be rendered by arbitrators who have no under-
standing of how the civil rights laws are to be applied to the workplace.13°
While the Commission monitors the procedures that affect all arbitration
cases, it does not have specific authority to review discrimination cases.13 1
Currently, the Commission does not compile information regarding the
nature, type, or outcome of employment cases or whether any trends are
emerging. 132 Critics who find Commission oversight of arbitration cases
insufficient, recommend a more active role by the Commission. Their
suggestions include establishing a formal periodic inspection system 133 to
follow up on the resolution of deficiencies the Commission finds during
inspections. 134  They also suggest including discrimination disputes
among the cases the Commission reviews during inspections. 35
B. The Characteristics of the Securities Industry Mandatory
Arbitration System Impact Negatively on Civil Rights Policy
The original purpose of the securities industry's arbitration system was
to facilitate the efficient resolution of investor disputes, not to resolve
129. Id.; see also Letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Director, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to Linda G. Morra, Director, Education and Employment Issues,
GAO 5, (Dec. 30, 1993), reprinted in 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, app. at 25 (stating
that in light of the rising interest in consumer protection in securities arbitration, the Com-
mission focuses its oversight on cases involving public customers).
130. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that arbitrators sitting on employ-
ment cases may have no requisite background or expertise in employment law).
131. Id. (explaining that the Commission has general oversight authority over the
whole industry arbitration, but focuses primarily on commercial disputes rather than on
employment disputes).
132. The Commission has no data from which to analyze trends in the outcomes of
these cases because SROs are not required to compile statistics on discrimination. Id. at
14.
133. The Commission's Division of Market Regulation conducts periodic inspections to
review SRO compliance, administration, and processing of arbitrations in order to provide
a recommendation to the SROs for the correction of deficiencies. Id. at 14-15. The GAO
found that because of the lag time between inspections, SROs typically are slow in imple-
menting Commission recommendations. See id. The GAO study concluded that "[b]y es-
tablishing a formal inspection cycle, SROs may be more inclined to respond expeditiously
to [Commission] recommendations made during previous inspections." Id. at 15.
134. The GAO determined that SROs had not fully implemented Commission recom-
mendations, allowing deficiencies to persist. Id. at 15. Therefore, the GAO suggested that
the Commission "follow up more vigorously on the implementation of its recommenda-
tions .... " Id. at 16.
135. Id.
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intra-industry employment discrimination disputes. 3 6 Despite this initial
focus, investors, exchange members, and securities industry employees
abide by the same rules and procedures throughout the arbitration pro-
cess, regardless of the nature of the pending claim.13 7 Several features of
the Code affect the appropriateness of resolving intra-industry employ-
ment claims through the securities industry's arbitration process, such as
the selection of arbitrators, arbitrator classification, and arbitrator knowl-
edge in the area of controversy. 138
1. Selection of Arbitrators
While few discrimination complaints may be filed and arbitrated by the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASD,' 3 9 it is important to
recognize that SROs use only one set of procedures to select arbitrators,
regardless of the nature of the claim.140 After reviewing a case, an SRO's
136. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (explaining that the arbitration sys-
tem was designed to resolve disputes between customers (investors), brokers and dealers).
137. NASD CAP § 1 (1993). The NASD Code of Arbitration provides: "[Flor the arbi-
tration of any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the busi-
ness of any member of the Association.... (1) between or among members; (2) between or
among members and public customers, or others . I..." d.; see also Shell, supra note 52, at
535-37. One real difference in treatment is the composition of arbitration panels: investor
disputes have three industry arbitrators while employee disputes have a majority of public
arbitrators on their panels. Id. at 537. In 1993, the NASD approved a rule which makes
employment disputes arbitrable and provides that discrimination claims must be heard by
an arbitration panel composed of a majority of public arbitrators. NASD Announces SEC
Approval Of Rules Making Employment Disputes Arbitrable, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1129, 1252 (Sept. 17, 1993).
138. Shell, supra note 52, at 535-36. In March 1994, the GAO published a report focus-
ing on the use of arbitration to settle employment discrimination disputes amongst securi-
ties firms and their registered representatives. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. The
report "arose out of a concern that statutory protections designed to safeguard the rights of
employees were being systematically denied by the securities industry." Levitt's Views
Sought Regarding Changes to Industry Arbitration Process, 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
876 (June 17, 1994) (quoting Letter from Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass), Rep. Marjorie
Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-Pa), and Lynn Schenk (D-Calif), to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (June 9, 1994)). While the report did not comment on
the fairness of individual NYSE and NASD discrimination cases, it identified weaknesses
and inconsistencies in arbitration procedures that may result in inappropriate arbitrator
selection. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra, at 9.
139. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The report notes that 34 discrimination
complaints were filed at the NYSE between January 1990 and December 1992. Id.
Although the SROs do not compile data on these complaints, interviews with SRO officials
indicate that of the 1,110 cases arbitrated at the NYSE between 1991 and 1992, 312 were
employment cases and only 5% of those were discrimination cases. Id.
140. Id. at 5. When a discrimination complaint is filed by a registered representative,
an arbitrator is selected by the SRO to serve on the panel. Id. The selection of arbitrators
under the Code is managed by the director of arbitration at the securities exchange or the
NASD. Shell, supra note 52, at 536. Conversely, the American Arbitration Association
places the burden of arbitrator selection on the parties. Id.; see, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRA-
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arbitration staff will appoint a panel of arbitrators.' 4 ' Although the par-
ties may challenge the placement of an arbitrator on the panel, there is
not a formal, initial consideration given to the capability of a prospective
arbitrator to address the particular legal claim at issue. 4
The current process of recruiting arbitrators frequently results in an
inadequate arbitrator pool, causing an unqualified arbitrator panel.'
43
Arbitrators primarily are recruited based on the recommendations of cur-
rent arbitrators, employees of the SROs, and the NASD Board of Gover-
nors or the NYSE Board.'" Additionally, the arbitration staff typically
recruits candidates from local bar associations.' 45 The arbitrators serving
in the SRO pools are predominantly white males with an average age of
sixty years.'
46
a. Classification of Arbitrators-Industry or Public
After securities arbitrators become part of the pool, they are divided
into two groups-"industry" or "public. ' 147 Arbitrators classified as "in-
dustry" are employed, associated with, or retired from member firms.'
48
TION ASSOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES § 14 (as amended and effective May
1, 1993) (stating that both parties may object to and rank the remainder of prospective
arbitrators in order of preference from two lists received from the AAA, the AAA then
invites arbitrators based on both lists and mutual order of preference) [hereinafter AAA
RULES].
141. See NASD CAP § 19. The parties are given notice of the names and affiliations of
the arbitrators and an opportunity to challenge the selection. NASD CAP §§ 21, 22. The
panel of arbitrators is also asked to initiate a conflict of interest check with the parties'
names, legal representation, and potential witnesses. NASD CAP § 23(a).
142. See NASD CAP §§ 4, 9. In a claim for less than $30,000, a single arbitrator shall
be appointed. Id. § 9. If the claim exceeds $30,000 three arbitrators shall be appointed.
Id.
143. See BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 369-70 (explaining that arbitrator
rosters are limited due to the inadequate word-of-mouth recruitment system).
144. Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321 (explaining the arbitrator recruitment
process); see also BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 369-70.
145. Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321.
146. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. While SROs do not keep statistical data on
characteristics of arbitrators, it is estimated that of the 726 arbitrators in NYSE pool as of
December 31, 1992, 89% were men and 11% women. Id. With regard to the 349 arbitra-
tors whose race was identifiable, 97% were white, .09% black, .06% were Asian and 1%
other. Id. The average age was 60 for men and 49 for women. Id.; see also Dunlop Panel
Hears Alternatives For Resolving Workplace Disputes, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 188, at
C-3 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 DAILY LAB. REP.] (highlighting testimony calling for
an increase in the number of female and minority arbitrators to make pools "more demo-
graphically representative of the workplace").
147. See Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321. One consideration given to choos-
ing an arbitrator is his or her classification as industry or public. Id.
148. Id. An industry arbitrator is one who is currently associated with a member firm,
or has been associated with a such firm within the last three years; is retired from a mem-
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Additionally, industry arbitrators include professionals whose work sub-
stantially involves broker/dealer matters. 149  Arbitrators classified as
"public" are persons not employed by member firms, and include attor-
neys, accountants, educators, and knowledgeable investors.' 50  This
method of classification, as well as the choice of the overall composition
of an arbitration panel, attempts to limit the appearance of conflict and
industry bias while maintaining a knowledgeable pool of arbitrators.' 5 '
Arbitrations are generally categorized by the type of controversy at issue,
then arbitrators are chosen pursuant to their "industry" or "public" clas-
sification.' 52 For example, all arbitration matters between member firms
are industry cases and require an industry panel of arbitrators.1 53 On the
other hand, an investor dispute with a member firm is classified as a pub-
lic dispute, and its panel consists of mostly public arbitrators.1 54 For arbi-
tration purposes, employment disputes also are treated as public disputes
and, therefore, are empaneled with a majority of public arbitrators.155
b. Arbitrator's Knowledge
Securities industry arbitration purports to provide parties with an im-
partial third-party arbitrator who possesses a unique understanding of the
ber firm; is registered with a member firm; or associated with a futures association or com-
modity exchange. NASD CAP § 19(c)(1-5).
149. Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321; see NASD CAP § 19(c)(4) (directing
that industry arbitrators include those professionals who have devoted at least twenty per-
cent of their work to industry clients within the last two years).
150. Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321 (explaining that industry arbitrators are
"individuals employed or associated with or retired from member firms"); see NASD CAP
§ 19(d) (amended effective May 10, 1989) (explaining that a person is not considered to be
a public arbitrator if his or her spouse, or a household member, is an employee or is associ-
ated with a member firm).
151. See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 109-10 (stating that SROs have attempted to limit
possible bias by arbitrators against customers by amending the rules to require that a ma-
jority of the arbitration panel include non-industry arbitrators); e.g., NASD CAP § 19(a);
NYSE RULE 607.
152. See BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 13 (explaining that SRO arbitra-
tion staff select arbitrators who are categorized as industry or public).
153. See NASD CAP § 9(b)(ii) (stating that, "in all arbitration matters between or
among members and/or persons associated with members and where the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $30,000, a panel shall consist of three arbitrators, all of whom shall be from
the securities industry").
154. See NASD CAP § 19(b) (stating: "In arbitration matters involving public custom-
ers and-where the amount in controversy exceeds $30,000 .... the Director of Arbitration
shall appoint an arbitration panel which consists of [between three and five arbitrators], at
least a majority of whom shall not be from the securities industry [unless requested by the
public customer]").
155. See NASD CAP § 9(a) (clarifying that employment related disputes are subject to
arbitration); 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP., supra note 137, at 1252.
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industry in which the controversy arose.15 6 Both critics and supporters of
securities arbitration agree that industry insight and expertise make arbi-
tration an appropriate forum for disputes arising out of true securities
issues (commercial cases). 57 Industry expertise allows arbitrators to
evaluate a claim in light of their understanding of securities industry op-
erations and customary standards of practice. 158
Critics assert that securities industry arbitrators' lack of expertise in,
and unfamiliarity with, current employment discrimination laws makes
securities arbitration an inappropriate arena for claims involving statu-
tory employment rights.'5 9 It is conceivable that an arbitrator with the
proper training or background could resolve an employment discrimina-
tion case adequately by utilizing appropriate legal standards.160 How-
156. LIProN, supra note 6, § 4.02[4], at 4-20 (stating that "securities industry arbitra-
tion, specifically, is intended as a system that can provide parties to a dispute with referees
who possess a unique familiarity with the nature of the business in which the dispute arose
and whose judgement reflects an understanding of that business"); ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURES, supra note 1, at 3-4 (stating, "[a]rbitration is a method of having a dispute between
two or more parties resolved by impartial persons who are knowledgeable in the areas in
controversy"); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 633 (1985) (noting that "access to expertise" is one "hallmark[ I" of arbitration).
157. For example, arbitrators who possess an understanding of industry practices en-
hance the chances that an accurate outcome is achieved faster as less time is spent "educat-
ing the trier of fact." FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 106-07 (noting that any lawyer
appreciates the time saved in arbitrating an issue before a panel that already understands
complex financial instruments); LIPTON, supra note 6, § 4.02, at 4-20 (explaining that an
industry arbitrator's insights to industry customs and practices are critical to evaluations of
securities related disputes). "Securities" violations include allegations of churning, unsuit-
able investments, negligent supervision of a broker, breach of fiduciary duty and making
unauthorized trades. BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 119-74. But see
BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra, at 245 (noting that employment related disputes typi-
cally "involve compensation, training costs, improper termination, responsibility and in-
demnification for customer losses, defamation after termination of the relationship, and
the enforceability of non-compete clauses").
158. LIPTON, supra note 6, § 4.02, at 4-20 (analogizing arbitrators to referees who pos-
sess a special and unique knowledge in their respective fields); see Bompey & Pappas,
supra note 11, at 211 (explaining that an arbitrator familiar with the industry involved in
the dispute will have a greater understanding of the issues involved).
159. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that because discrimination
cases raise issues different than typical commercial/securities issues, it is appropriate to
empanel arbitrators with employment law expertise). For examples of the intricacies of
employment discrimination laws, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2 through 2000e-17 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 US.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment solely on the basis of age).
160. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (stat-
ing that "arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling ... factual and legal complexi-
ties . . .") (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633-34 (1985)).
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ever, there is currently no requirement in the selection process that an
arbitrator be knowledgeable in employment law. 6 '
All SROs have adopted 162 SICA's Arbitration Procedures. Those pro-
cedures provide that an arbitrator should be versed in the areas of con-
troversy.' 63 These procedures, however, only attempt to reduce the
appearance of conflict through a method of classification, they do not
ensure that public arbitrators empaneled on an employment dispute
claim are any more knowledgeable in employment issues than industry
arbitrators.'" While public arbitrators may bring a sense of comfort to
public investors and employees fearful of industry bias, 65 their public
characterization does not guarantee that they have any expertise, back-
ground, or knowledge in employment law. 166 On the other hand, a mem-
ber firm or public investor bringing a suit on a securities issue can be
assured that an industry arbitrator will have a sufficient level of expertise
or experience in the area and, thus, will be qualified to resolve the dis-
pute.167 Similarly, a public investor can feel comfortable with public arbi-
trators settling securities disputes because these arbitrators typically have
some legal, practical, or educational experience with securities issues.
168
Critics highlight the fact that the SROs do not necessarily consider an
arbitrator's expertise in a particular subject area as a primary criterion for
selection.' 69 Contrary to the securities industry's assertion that arbitra-
tion provides parties with an arbitrator who is knowledgeable in the area
161. See 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that neither the NASD nor
NYSE "systematically assigns arbitrators to panels on the basis of subject matter exper-
tise"); BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 370 (explaining that arbitrators receive
no training as a prerequisite to acceptance as a panelist).
162. See supra notes 118-35 and accompanying text (explaining the role of SROs).
163. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
164. See Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321 (explaining that the method of arbi-
trator classification is intended to simultaneously limit the appearance of industry bias and
maintain a pool of knowledgeable arbitrators). But see 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1,
at 12-13 (noting that discrimination disputes raise unique issues such as the interpretation
of federal civil rights laws as compared with the typical industry dispute involving securities
statutes and industry practices).
165. See 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 60 (stating that "[riegardless of [the]
forum, the fairness of any arbitration proceeding depends largely on the independence and
capability of the arbitrators").
166. See Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321 (indicating that public arbitrators are
typically accountants, attorneys, academics in the field of securities, or others that are not
affiliated with a securities firm).
167. See NASD CAP § 19(c)(1-5). Industry arbitrators are either currently active in
the securities industry or were recently associated with it. Id.
168. See NASD CAP § 19(d).
169. See Katsoris, supra note 119, at 310 (stating that an SRO's Director of Arbitration
may select arbitrators from a roster of individuals based on a " 'roll of the drum' " rather
than expending "effort to match the problems of the case with the expertise of the arbitra-
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of controversy, individual arbitrators are not selected from the pool based
on having expertise congruent to the type of dispute being decided. 7 '
Rather, industry-sponsored arbitration programs select arbitrators based
on their classification, their availability for the hearing dates, and their
willingness to sit on a panel. 17 1 Because securities arbitrators frequently
are guided by commercial wisdom and not by a rule of law in resolving
disputes, 172 these methods of selection are adequate when the issues
presented in the claim are securities-related. 73 Critics contend, however,
that this method of selection fails to consider the unique requirements of
a non-securities claim, such as an employment discrimination suit. Nor,
they say, does it take into account the requisite knowledge or training
needed to resolve effectively a dispute under the current discrimination
and civil rights laws and their underlying policies.' 74
The SROs require arbitrators to take an initial mandatory training pro-
gram to ensure that they have been trained adequately in the arbitration
process.' 75 The SROs do not, however, require similar training in specific
tors"); 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (highlighting the absence of a subject matter
expertise requirement in SRO arbitration).
170. Masucci & Morris, supra note 118, at 321 (explaining that arbitrator selection is
predicated on an arbitrator's affiliation with the securities industry-industry or public).
Other factors that are considered in the selection process include the potential arbitrator's
education, employment, availability, possible conflict of interest, frequency of service and
ratings, and with respect to potential chairpersons, whether the candidate is an attorney.
Telephone Interview with Attorney at the National Association of Securities Dealers, Ar-
bitration Department, Washington, D.C. (April 19, 1995) [hereinafter Attorney Interview];
see also NASD CAP § 19(d) (providing for arbitrator selection based on industry affilia-
tion rather than subject matter expertise).
171. For example, the NASD requires that arbitrators be knowledgeable in the area of
controversy, yet assigns arbitrators based on an objective classification of either public or
industry. NASD CAP § 19(a). Because arbitrators are essentially volunteers, availability
is a key factor in the selection process. This statement is based on the author's experience
empaneling arbitrators for the Washington, D.C. Arbitration Department (1994).
172. NASD, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 26 (1992) (stating that arbitrators are not
"bound by case precedent or statutory law," but are prohibited from manifestly disregard-
ing the law) [hereinafter ARBITRATION MANUAL].
173. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1985) (noting that parties utilize arbitration especially because of the expertise of the
arbitrators).
174. See Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA Special Supp.) No. 6, at 31 (Jan. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter 1995 DAILY LAB. REP.] (stating that arbitrators familiar with the laws at issue
are an essential element to private arbitration); 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
The Report concludes that: "Since discrimination cases involving registered representatives
raise issues that are different from the securities-related disputes administered by SROs, it
may be appropriate to consider whether the panels for these cases should be comprised
differently, and include at least one arbitrator with expertise in employment or discrimina-
tion law." Id.
175. NASD, INTRODUCrORY TRAINING FOR ARBITRATORS 2, (Feb. 1, 1994).
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areas of the law.'7 6 Although the securities arbitration system effectively
resolves securities issues within the arbitrator's range of expertise, critics
contend that the arbitrator's narrow range of knowledge makes him or
her underqualified to resolve issues beyond the scope of securities is-
sues.17 7 Critics therefore recommend that the Commission direct SROs
to assess, maintain, and utilize information on an arbitrator's expertise
when selecting arbitration panels, especially in cases involving discrimina-
tion disputes. 178
2. Impact on Civil Rights
Even if competent securities arbitrators had expertise in the substan-
tive areas of employment law, such arbitrated awards nevertheless fail to
preserve one of the goals of civil rights law-the end of discrimination.
179
The securities industry arbitration system fails to provide internal gui-
dance on employment relations between a registered representative and
broker employers because arbitral awards do not disseminate informa-
tion through written, reasoned opinions. 180 As a result, securities indus-
176. Id. (stating that while training is an ongoing process and an introductory session is
required, second level training, which is "a more indepth study of selected topics" such as
employment law, is encouraged, but currently not required). The training manual does ask
that arbitrators inform the NASD of any special knowledge in the area of employment
discrimination. Id. at 3. Additionally, the NASD and the AAA offer joint employment
law training seminars on an optional basis. Attorney Interview, supra note 170.
177. See 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that arbitrators do not have
any special training in the area of employment law and therefore are not equipped to
handle such issues capably).
178. Id. at 16; see id. app. II at 28. The Commission responded, on review of GAO
concerns in this area, that employment law issues raised in discrimination cases are suffi-
ciently different from the experience of many arbitrators. Id. Therefore, it would be ap-
propriate for SROs to develop additional training in that area. Id. The GAO notes that
the NASD already has begun such training. Id. The Commission also agrees "that it may
be valuable to assess arbitrators' training and experience when appointing arbitrators to
the panels for discrimination cases." Id. The Commission cautions that arbitrator selec-
tions based solely on expertise may result in an imbalanced panel in favor of one of the
parties. Id.
179. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. E1753 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Mar-
key) (using the securities industry as an example to explain that mandatory arbitration of
employment claims in effect allows corporate America to opt out of the antidiscrimination
laws); id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (stating that mandatory arbitration forces many
American workers to choose between protecting their jobs or protecting their civil rights,
thereby undermining the goals of civil rights legislation); Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at
214-15 (arguing that an essentially private arbitration system is not conducive to imple-
menting the policies underlying antidiscrimination laws); see infra notes 243-48 and accom-
panying text (explaining that the procedural protections provided in nonarbitrated civil
rights cases are not available in the securities industry arbitration system).
180. See Lipton, supra note 19, at 888 (stating that the securities industry arbitration
system offers no internal guidance on the law regarding customer/broker relations and is
similarly incapable of advancing this law); see generally Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at
1200
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try arbitration does not operate on the principle of stare decisis. 8' More
significantly, this lack of written explanation stifles the generation of legal
precedent. 182 Although arbitrators' decisions are not based on prece-
dent, prior decisions could assist a party in preparing written submissions
and oral presentations in subsequent proceedings. 83
On appeal of an arbitration award, the standard of review, whether the
arbitrator has demonstrated a manifest disregard for the law, is also im-
paired by the lack of a written opinion spelling out the arbitrator's find-
ings of fact and the reasons leading to the decision. 1" The manifest
disregard standard is essentially meaningless unless the arbitral award
sets out in visible terms the arbitrator's decision-making process.
1 85
Other industries use precedential guidance in discrimination cases, yet,
mandatory arbitration of employee discrimination claims in the securities
211 (explaining that labor arbitration proceedings are very informal and, as a consequence,
are "too thin to ... develop public law").
181. Justin P. Klein & Heather Moyer, The Award, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION supra
note 6, § 10.05 (stating that arbitral awards have no precedential value because they are
devoid of findings of fact and conclusions of law); ARBITRATION MANUAL, supra note 172,
at 26 (noting that when deliberating a dispute, securities arbitrators are not bound by case
precedent).
182. Lipton, supra note 19, at 888 (stating that a rule of precedent is impossible when
written, reasoned decisions are not required); see also ARBITRATION MANUAL, supra note
172, at 30 (noting that under current law, "an arbitrator is not required to give a reason for
[his or her] decision"). The award should include: the names of the parties, the date of
filing and what award was rendered, names of counsel, a summary of the issues, the
amount of the claim, the number, time, and location of hearings, and any other miscellane-
ous matters decided such as jurisdiction or as the names and signatures of the arbitrator.
Id.
183. Lipton, supra note 19, at 888 (arguing the virtues of a written, reasoned award).
184. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (stating that an arbitral award which evi-
dences a manifest disregard for the law will be subject to judicial review); see also Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
disregard by arbitrators of "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable" governing law
constitutes grounds for setting aside an arbitration award).
185. Lipton, supra note 19, at 888; see also 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 32
(explaining that in order for a court to review an arbitral decision, the court must have a
permanent record to ensure the arbitrators's "understanding and interpretation of the rele-
vant legal doctrines"); Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933. In its decision, the court explained that
"manifest disregard of the law" requires that
The [arbitrator's] error must have been obvious and capable of being readily
and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.
Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the exist-
ence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no atten-
tion to it.
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industry removes all opportunity for such precedential guidance. 86 As a
result, the development of employment policy in the securities industry is
impeded by an arbitration system that, in failing to use precedent, is in-
consistent and unpredictable.' 87 The lack of written rationales, aggra-
vated by the absence of stare decisis, shields arbitrated employment
disputes from public scrutiny, thereby violating the deterrent intent of the
antidiscrimination laws.18 8
C. A Proposal to Amend the Civil Rights Statutes
In August of 1994, three members of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives 189 responded to the negative impact of compulsory arbitra-
tion of employment discrimination claims in the securities industry' 90 by
introducing the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act."' This Act
would prevent employers in all industries from requiring employees to
submit any discrimination claims to arbitration. 192 The bill, if passed,
would effectively overturn Gilmer, in which the Supreme Court com-
pelled the arbitration of a securities industry employee's ADEA claim.' 93
186. See Lipton, supra note 19, at 888-89. "If universal arbitration of broker/dealer
controversies replaced judicial litigation.., the arbitration system no longer would find the
same precedential guidance from reported case law." Id. at 889.
187. Id.
188. The equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act were enacted to assure
equality of employment opportunities by prohibiting those employment practices and de-
vices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-e-17 (1988)); see also Magyar, supra
note 3, at 655-56 (concluding that the public interest involved in civil rights claims requires
public awareness and involvement).
189. House Democrats Introduce Bill to Bar Compulsory Arbitration of Bias Claims,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No, 158 at A-1 (Aug. 18, 1994) [hereinafter AUGUST 1994 DAILY
LAB. REP.]. The sponsors of the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act were Representa-
tives Markey, Schroeder, and Margolies-Mezvinsky. Id.
190. CONG. REC., supra note 179, at E1753 (statement of Rep. Markey) (highlighting
that securities arbitration is run by SROs with industry members on each panel, and with
arbitrators inexperienced with employment law in addition to "a distinct set of procedures,
no access to a jury, no right to appeal, and no requirement that the arbitrators even follow
the letter of the law in rendering their decision").
191. AUGUST 1994 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 189, at A-1. The Civil Rights Proce-
dures Protection Act "would amend seven federal laws, including Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... ." Id.
The amendment provides that protections granted by these laws cannot be overridden by
contract, general federal law, or by any other means. Id. Additionally, it amends the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, making that Act inapplicable to federal, state, or local claims of un-
lawful discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability. See
CONG. REC., supra note 179, at E1754 (statement of Rep. Markey) (regarding the protec-
tions of the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act).
192. AUGUST 1994 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 189, at A-1.
193. Id.
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Responding to the increasing use of compulsory PDAAs, the bill would
prohibit employers from denying employees the ability to bring employ-
ment discrimination and sexual harassment claims in a judicial forum.'94
Introducing the bill, Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Ma) asserted that
PDAAs obstruct the goals of antidiscrimination laws, and he proposed to
correct this problem through judicial enforcement. 195 The representa-
tives who support the bill claim that without judicial review, employees
cannot exercise their statutory rights, and therefore, employers are less
inclined to comply with antidiscrimination laws.'9 6 Specifically, the bill
responds to the securities industry's substitution of an impartial and in-
dependent judicial forum with a private arbitration system in which doubt
exists as to the neutrality and independence.' 97
Arbitration is often an efficient and low-cost alternative to litigation.' 98
Furthermore, if conducted fairly, arbitration may be beneficial to all par-
ties. 99 But the benefits cannot outweigh the damages caused by the cur-
rent securities industry arbitration system which undermines the public
policy, remedial, and deterrent functions of civil rights laws.200 In partic-
ular, the representatives noted procedural differences between arbitra-
tion and adjudication, such as limited discovery, the lack of written
explanation for decisions, and the lack of legal precedent. These differ-
ences result in a non-adjudicative system poorly suited to protect individ-
ual civil rights.20' Protection of civil rights "requires both a public forum
and one that can bind employers through precedent, the for[c]e of law,
and moral [per]suasion. ' '212 Compulsory industry arbitration provides
none of these essential elements of civil rights protection.20 3
194. CONG. REC., supra note 179, at E1753 (statement of Rep. Markey) (introducing
the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994). Representative Markey explained
that signing an arbitration contract is frequently a condition of employment or advance-
ment, or may be required to gain employee benefits, such as stock options. Id.
- 195. Id. The legislation, however, does specifically permit employees to voluntarily
elect to resolve an employment claim under arbitration but only after the claim has arisen.
Id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
196. Id. (statement of Rep. Markey) (explaining that the current securities industry ar-
bitration system allows the whole industry to opt out of the antidiscrimination laws).
197. Id. (highlighting the limitations of securities industry arbitration).
198. See FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 4.7-4.9, § 4.12.
199. CONG. REC., supra note 179, at E1754.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at E1753-1754.
203. See 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 27 (asserting that the Gilmer Court
merely assumed that the securities industry arbitration system provided the essential pro-
tections for disputes in an employment setting).
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III. CHALLENGING GILMER'S CONTROL OF FUTURE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
Many courts have examined the arbitrability of employment-related
claims since the Gilmer decision.2°4 In Gilmer, the Court reasoned that
arbitration, in conjunction with the role of the EEOC in statutory dis-
crimination claims, offered sufficient nonlitigation procedural protections
of the ADEA's goals.2 05 Adopting the reasoning of Gilmer, courts have
ruled in favor of allowing arbitration of employment discrimination
claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII).10 6 In enforcing agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims, pursuant
to Gilmer's reasoning, courts make several mistaken assumptions. First,
courts assume that Title VII and the ADEA deserve similar treatment.20 7
Courts also assume that the EEOC can adequately protect and advance
the anti-age discrimination intent of the ADEA.208 Finally, courts as-
sume that commercial and civil rights disputes involve the same inter-
ests. 09 Operating under these misassumptions, the courts refuse to
consider how the dispute resolution methods of securities industry arbi-
204. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1992, at 3 (providing examples and analysis of post-Gilmer cases).
205. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-29, 32 n.4 (1991)
(concluding that the remedial and deterrent functions of the civil rights legislation were
preserved through arbitration, the EEOC's independent enforcement role, and a limited
judicial review of arbitration decisions).
206. Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 204, at 3; see, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (applying Gilmer's mandatory
arbitration to Title VII and state law claims of battery); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (reconsidering and overturning a pre-Gilmer refusal
to compel arbitration in a Title VII case); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d.
305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to arbitrate
a securities dealer's discrimination claim to be in error after Gilmer); see also Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2, et seq. (1982)).
207. See, e.g., Alford, 939 F.2d at 230 (finding Title VII claims comparable to the
ADEA for the purposes of requiring mandatory arbitration). But see infra notes 211-29
and accompanying text (explaining that PDAAs involving Title VII are distinguishable
from those involving the ADEA and, therefore, deserve different treatment).
208. See, e.g., Alford, 939 F.2d at 230 (referring to EEOC enforcement of the ADEA);
but see infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text (explaining that EEOC oversight does
not effectively further the antidiscriminatory intent of Title VII).
209. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (comparing
the concerns in arbitration bargaining power between a securities dealer and investor, to
that between an employer and civil rights claimant). But see infra notes 249-58 and accom-
panying text (explaining that the Gilmer Court failed to recognize that while arbitration
may be entirely appropriate to protect private commercial interests, it is wholly unfit to
protect the public interest in civil rights).
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tration fails to provide the appropriate safeguards in deciding civil rights
arbitration cases.210
A. Title VII Requires Different Treatment Than the ADEA
The fundamental distinctions between Title VII and the ADEA illus-
trate the necessity of deciding Title VII arbitration cases differently than
Gilmer decided similar ADEA claims.211 Because the ADEA was
modeled after Title VII, it is substantively similar to Title VII. However,
the distinct basis of discrimination-age as opposed to race and gender-
and the procedural variations-preservation of state antidiscrimination
laws-suggest that Congress viewed race and gender discrimination as
more egregious than age discrimination.212
The Gilmer decision suggests that even claims of societal interest are
arbitrable, absent proof of Congressional intent to preserve access to a
judicial forum.213 The differences between Title VII and ADEA proce-
dures may evidence such Congressional intent. While Title VII preserves
parallel state antidiscrimination procedures,214 the ADEA does not grant
equal weight to such procedures.2 15 Title VII's enforcement procedures
require a claimant to file a discrimination charge with either the EEOC
or a qualified state agency.216 If the Title VII charge is initially received
by the EEOC, it must defer to the appropriate state agency for sixty
210. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 214-19 (discussing how the decision in Gilmer
may be faulted in light of civil rights' legislation goals and arbitration procedures).
211. See infra notes 212-29 (explaining that the different purpose, intent and proce-
dures of Title VII and the ADEA require future Title VII decisions to be distinguished
from Gilmer).
212. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 225 (stating that "[tihe procedures of Title VII
evince a legislative intent to preserve state antidiscrimination procedures. [But] ADEA
does not recognize and preserve the state procedures to the same extent.").
213. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (suggesting that even the most important claims should be
arbitrated unless Congress specifically provides otherwise). But see Godsil Cooper, supra
note 16, at 225 (explaining that the Alexander Court's review of legislative intent con-
cluded that Congress intended Title VII claims not be sent to arbitration because of an
overriding national policy designed to prevent race discrimination).
214. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 225 (stating that one of the compromises reached
in Title VII was the preservation of state's rights).
215. Id.
216. Hillock, supra note 17, at 197.
[T]he [EEOC] shall endeavor to enter into agreements with 706 Agencies and
other fair employment practice agencies to establish effective and integrated reso-
lution procedures. Such agreements may include, but need not be limited to, co-
operative arrangements to provide for processing of certain charges by the
Commission, rather than by the 706 Agency during the [exclusive sixty day
processing period afforded to state agencies].
Id. at 197 n. 121 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b)(1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c)(revised as of
July 1, 1990)) (alterations in original).
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days.217 Then, when the EEOC has the authority to process the claim, it
notifies the employer of the claim and may conduct an investigation.218
A Title VII claim may be heard in federal court unless the state admin-
istrative proceedings have been reviewed by a state court.219 Once the
state court reviews the administrative proceedings, federal action is pre-
cluded.220 Conversely, under the ADEA, a state proceeding must termi-
nate upon the initiation of suit.221 Congress' refusal to preempt state
antidiscrimination laws which provide greater protection than federal
law, demonstrates the weight Congress attaches to the goal of equal em-
ployment opportunity.222
In enacting Title VII, Congress relied upon the availability of judicial
review to eliminate employment discrimination.223 The courts retain final
responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII.224 Courts are authorized
to remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices through affirma-
tive action.225 Title VII's preservation of the rights and procedures under
state antidiscrimination laws connotes that such rights "should not be
subject to waiver of a judicial forum, notwithstanding the FAA['s]" policy
favoring arbitration.226 There can be no compulsory arbitration of state
antidiscrimination statutes under the FAA because Title VII precludes
the waiver of state antidiscrimination rights and procedures.227 Similarly,
217. Id. at 197. The EEOC determines which state and local agencies have the proper
jurisdiction and enforcement authority to handle discrimination claims. Id. at 197 n.122.
The EEOC will not, however, defer a charge to a state agency unless it has proper subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
218. Id. at 197; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (stating that the Commission shall afford
"substantial weight" to state or local agency findings to determine whether there is "rea-
sonable cause to believe that the charge is true").
219. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1994) (providing that federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear alleged civil rights violations); Godsil Cooper, supra note
16, at 225 (stating that Title VII preserves states' rights by requiring the EEOC to give
"great weight" to state agency findings regarding a charge of discrimination); see Univer-
sity of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99 (1986) (holding a Title VII suit was not
barred by a prior, unreviewed administrative proceeding).
220. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 225; Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461, 475-76 (1982) (declaring that Title VII actions must give full faith and credit to final
state court judgements).
221. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq.
(1988 and Supp. V 1993).
222. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 225-26 n.145 (noting that state laws are pre-
empted by Title VII only when they require an act in violation of Title VII).
223. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974).
224. Id. at 44.
225. Id.
226. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 226.
227. But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 n.3, 29 (1991)
(rejecting claimant's nonwaiver argument because the ADEA does not expressly preclude
arbitration). The recently enacted Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
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the Title VII action should not be waived in lieu of arbitration because
Title VII actions may be brought in either state or federal court.228
Therefore, a claimant retains the right to file a Title VII claim in court,
regardless of the FAA's validation of arbitration.229
B. The Role of the EEOC Does Not Necessarily Effectuate
Congressional Intent
The claimant in Gilmer argued that arbitration of the ADEA claim
would undermine the EEOC's investigation and enforcement role under
the ADEA.23 ° The Court rejected this argument noting that despite
compulsory arbitration, an employee was still able to file a charge with
the EEOC. 231 Additionally, the Court reasoned that the EEOC's in-
dependent authority to investigate discrimination claims furthered Con-
gressional intent to eliminate discrimination. Hence, arbitration would
not preclude enforcement of the ADEA.232 An examination of the ac-
tual capabilities of the EEOC emphasizes the importance of preserving a
judicial forum in both Title VII and ADEA cases. 233 The EEOC's over-
whelming caseload continues to swell at the same time that there is a
simultaneous decrease in the investigative staff. This causes a reduction
in the quality of attention given to investigations and the number of court
actions filed by the EEOC.2
34
As a result of growing case loads and decreasing staff, the EEOC's
backlog presently approaches 97,000 cases. 235 These statistics cast grave
(OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (Supp. V 1992)),
amended the ADEA. It provided that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim
under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 n.3
(quoting § 201) (alteration in original). The OWBPA was not in effect when Gilmer was
decided, however, the Court noted the Act in order to illustrate that the settlement of a
claim without the involvement of the EEOC does not undermine the role of the EEOC in
enforcing ADEA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
228. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 226.
229. Id.
230. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
231. Id. (noting that Gilmer had subsequently filed a charge with the EEOC).
232. Id. (noting that "the EEOC's role... is not dependent on the filing of a charge
233. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 219-20 (explaining the Gilmer Court's conclusion
that notwithstanding the arbitration of a discrimination dispute, the role of the EEOC is
preserved because an individual retains the right to file a discrimination charge with the
EEOC who may then initiate a subsequent investigation and/or a judicial action).
234. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 44 (explaining that the decline in the
number of EEOC investigators has caused an increase in the average caseload per investi-
gator "from 51.3 in [fiscal year] 1990 to 122.0 in [fiscal year] 1994").
235. Currently, there are approximately 97,000 complaints awaiting EEOC investiga-
tion. Id.; see Complaints of Bias Climbed in '92, EEOC Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at
1995] 1207
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doubt on the Gilmer Court's argument that the EEOC enforces statutory
civil rights adequately.23 6 The limited capacity and resources of the
EEOC strongly support the proposition that private judicial actions are
the best means to effectuate the intent of Title VII.237 Yet, this means is
extinguished when PDAAs, which bar judicial resolution of the claim, are
enforced.238
C. Differences Between Civil Rights and Commercial Disputes Warrant
a Lesser Deference to Arbitration
The Gilmer Court did not address the fundamental differences be-
tween commercial and employment discrimination disputes, thereby
making it weak precedent for subsequent employment disputes in the se-
curities industry.239 Civil rights are a public interest safeguarded by fed-
eral legislation.24 ° This legislative commitment to ending all forms of
discrimination mandates that remedies for violations of these rights be
sought in the public forum.241 Critics assert that the same characteristics
of arbitration that make it inexpensive, effective, and efficient in resolv-
ing commercial claims, simultaneously defeat the purpose of civil rights
protections. These characteristics essentially remove employment dis-
crimination claims from the public eye, replace a judge and jury with arbi-
D3 (explaining that, in 1992, "Ulob-related discrimination complaints reached their second-
highest annual total since the 1964 Civil Rights Act became law").
236. Godsil Cooper, supra note 16, at 220 (examining the number of suits filed by the
EEOC in the Northern District of Illinois and comparing that number with the number of
individual suits filed in that district, concluding that the EEOC tends to file mainly "class
action" suits).
237. Id. EEOC suits tend to be class actions, however, individuals rarely satisfy class
certification. Id. Thus, without private access to a judicial forum, an individual's claim
might not adequately be resolved. Id.
238. See id.
239. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (relying on the
FAA line of cases which resolved commercial arbitration disputes (non-employment re-
lated), the court failed to acknowledge the unique character of civil rights claims and the
policies behind their implementation).
240. The basic right to equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, national origin, age, or disability is guaranteed in federal legislation. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin); the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e etseq. (1982)) (prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of gender); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of age); and the Americans With Disabilities Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Supp. V
1993)) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of a disability).
241. Magyar, supra note 3, at 654-55 (stating, "the public has a stake in statutory civil
rights claims ... because their resolution changes societal relationships").
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trators, limit discovery, limit judicial review, and hinder the development
of discrimination law and policy.242
These ramifications are precisely what distinguish civil rights claims
from commercial claims in determining their appropriateness for arbitra-
tion in the securities industry.243 In an effort to save time and resources,
arbitrators are not required to provide written, reasoned arbitral deci-
sions. The trade-off for this efficiency is a limited judicial review of arbi-
tration awards. Furthermore, without written decisions the strict
standard for judicial review, manifest disregard for the law, cannot be
conclusively established.2 4 Because arbitrators are not required to docu-
ment their findings of fact or conclusions of law, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the arbitrators actually manifestly disregarded the law.2 45
Limited judicial review combined with ambiguous arbitral awards, cre-
ate the risk of perpetuated discrimination by allowing industry arbitrators
to craft their own standards, rather than utilizing the "reasonable person"
standard.246 Furthermore, in order to be reviewed and possibly vacated
by a court, arbitration awards require evidence of an arbitrator's failure
to decide disputes correctly under antidiscrimination laws. 247 The fact
that arbitrators are not required to document clearly their decisions
under the law, makes the manifest disregard standard for judicial review
essentially an anomaly.248
242. Id. at 655.
243. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that the disregard by arbitrators of "well-defined, explicit, and clearly appli-
cable" governing law constitutes grounds for setting aside an arbitration award under the
"'manifest disregard' standard").
244. See Klein & Moyer, supra note 181, § 10.05 (noting that the reasons against writ-
ten, reasoned awards include the amount of time needed to prepare an award and the
possibility of discouraging individuals from serving as arbitrators since their determina-
tions may be judicially challenged).
245. Patrick Daugherty & Clayton W. Davidson, III, Enforcing or Appealing an Arbi-
tral Award, in SECURmES ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at § 11.02[2], at 11-38 to 11-39
(noting the difficulty in determining whether an arbitrator has disregarded the law since
arbitrators need not write opinions or fully explain their decisions).
246. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 73 (1986) (setting out the stan-
dard for discrimination as conduct which a reasonable person would find hostile); see also
Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 693, 718-19
(1993) (illustrating that the public interest in statutory employment law may demand more
intensive judicial review).
247. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 32 (highlighting the importance of writ-
ten arbitral opinions which spell out in "understandable terms the basis for the arbitrator's
ruling").
248. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 88
(1992) (stating that "if the arbitrator does not prepare a written opinion, the applicable law
cannot be delineated and analyzed") (quoting Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory
Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
1995] 1209
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IV. THE GILMER COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE UNIQUE
CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION
Gilmer resulted in the compulsory arbitration of an employment dis-
crimination dispute pursuant to a standard securities industry PDAA.249
The Court's holding relied on the FAA's mandate favoring arbitration,250
the role of the EEOC in discrimination claims,2 1 and the Commission's
oversight authority.252 The Court determined that collectively, these pro-
tections provide procedural and substantive safeguards comparable to
those available in a judicial forum.253 The Court's reasoning, however,
failed to recognize several key factors unique to the securities industry
arbitration system. First, the Court ignored the fact that the securities
industry arbitration system originally was created and designed to resolve
customer's nonemployment-related, commercial claims, and further, that
the creators did not foresee resolving the present scope of disputes.2 54
Second, the Court failed to recognize that arbitration is intended to re-
solve disputes via an impartial third party who is knowledgeable in the
area of controversy-a characteristic the current securities arbitration
system gives little consideration when empaneling arbitrators.2 55 Further,
while the Court was comforted by existing Commission oversight of in-
dustry arbitration, the Court failed to recognize that Commission over-
sight of SRO arbitration focuses on reviewing nonemployment-related
RESOL. 157, 198 (1989)). Daugherty & Davidson, III, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION, supra
note 245, § 11.02[2], at 11-38 to 11-39 (noting the difficulty in determining whether an
arbitrator has disregarded the law without written opinions spelling out the basis for the
decision).
249. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that a
PDAA mandates arbitration of a claim under the ADEA).
250. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (validating written agreements to arbitrate).
251. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29, 32 (stressing that the arbitration process does not pre-
clude a subsequent EEOC judicial investigation and resolution); see supra notes 230-38
and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's powers at length).
252. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
253. Id. at 26, 30-31 (explaining that parties trade-off some procedural and substantive
rights for the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration but claimants do not "forgo"
their rights entirely).
254. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1601-02 (explaining that one Uniform Code of
Arbitration may not be appropriate for the resolution of the different kinds of substantive
claims it is currently facing); SICA REPORT #5 at 2-3 (stating that conference members
drafted a uniform code of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes such as those between
brokers, dealers, and customers).
255. Attorney Interview, supra note 170. Absent any procedural rule, the NASD's cur-
rent policy is to consider employment law expertise when selecting a panel's chairperson.
Id.
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customer/firm disputes because its role is one of consumer protection.
Similarly, the Court failed to recognize the distinction between employ-
ment disputes and nonemployment-related commercial claims and their
effect on procedural safeguards, especially in light of the unique charac-
teristics of the current securities arbitration system. 57 In short, Gilmer
fails to insist upon a fair system of arbitration for the resolution of future
employment claims.25s
A. Modification of the Current Securities Industry Arbitration System
vs. Removal of Employment Disputes from the System
Employment discrimination claims demand a system of arbitration
properly designed to satisfy the public interest objectives of the various
antidiscrimination statutes governing the employment relationship.259
The arbitration system must not foster discrimination problems through a
lack of procedural and substantive safeguards.260 The capability of secur-
ities industry arbitration to vindicate employment discrimination claims
can be addressed in two ways: by amending portions of the arbitration
system which affect fairness;261 or by prohibiting arbitration of employ-
ment claims.262
256. See Letter from Robert L.D. Colby, to Linda Morra, supra note 129, at 5 (explain-
ing that SEC oversight focuses on consumer protection rather than intra-industry
disputes).
257. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1602 (commenting that a one size fits all arbitra-
tion system may not address the complex cases entering the forum); supra notes 249-58
and accompanying text (distinguishing between commercial and civil rights disputes).
258. Cf. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 30 (explaining that private arbitra-
tion must meet certain quality standards to insure the protection of the "social values em-
bodied in public employment law").
259. E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) (prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of gender); the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1988 and Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of age); and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the ba-
sis of a disability).
260. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1631 (commenting that SROs should adopt pro-
cedures directly addressing employment disputes); supra Section II (B) and accompanying
text (explaining that the current securities industry arbitration system fails to provide the
procedural and substantive protections necessary to safeguard civil rights claims).
261. See infra notes 263-78 and accompanying text (suggesting modifications to securi-
ties industry arbitration).
262. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed Civil
Rights Procedures Protection Act which would prohibit mandatory arbitration of civil
rights claims).
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Modification of the securities industry arbitration system would include
a divergence in the manner by which SROs currently treat commercial
claims and civil rights employment discrimination claims.263 The most
important distinction between commercial claims and civil rights claims in
securities industry arbitration is the composition of the arbitrator panel
selected to resolve the dispute.26 Securities industry arbitration was
founded on a principle that arbitrators be "knowledgeable in the areas in
controversy" and as a result, arbitrators with a core knowledge in the
securities laws and securities industry's customs and practices are consid-
ered the most desirable.265 Securities related commercial disputes are
currently resolved by a panel of arbitrators with a specialization in the
field of securities. 266 Under the same principle, the arbitrators em-
paneled to resolve employment discrimination disputes should meet that
same specialization requirement-specifically, an understanding of the
civil rights laws and policies at issue in the dispute.267 Therefore, arbitra-
tion panels resolving discrimination suits should be composed primarily
of public arbitrators, 268 a majority of whom specialize in the area of em-
ployment law.269 This treatment is mandated because the focus of em-
ployment discrimination disputes are the civil rights laws prohibiting such
263. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 18, at 1601-02 (inquiring whether the Uniform
Code of Arbitration should be divided into "subchapters" to address different substantive
claims).
264. Brunet, supra note 248, at 88 (explaining that historically, arbitrator's were experts
in the subject matter of the dispute). Employment discrimination disputes revolve around
the civil rights laws affecting the employment relationship. See supra note 240 (highlight-
ing the federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination). Currently, SROs character-
ize and select arbitrators based on their knowledge of, or affiliation with the securities
industry. NASD CAP § 19(c)(1-5) and (d) (distinguishing between public and industry
arbitrators).
265. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 4-5.
266. NASD CAP § 19(c)(1-5) (defining industry arbitrators).
267. See Statement by Professor Samuel Estreicher before the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations Panel on Private Dispute Resolution Alternatives, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 188, at D-3 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter SEPT. 1994 DAILY LAB.
REP.] (noting that arbitrators should be lawyers or judges with experience in employment
law).
268. NASD CAP § 19(d) (defining those who fit within the definition of public
arbitrator).
269. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1632 (recommending the maintenance of "a se-
lect panel comprised . . . of [arbitrators] with considerable experience in employment
law"); Symposium, supra at 1679 (noting that the repair of the existing system for arbitra-
tor training and selection should address criteria for inclusion in the pool of arbitrators,
assignment of arbitrators to particular substantive matters, and the type of training that
qualifies an arbitrator to be knowledgeable on the substantive area in controversy); 1994
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (distinguishing between securities related disputes and
employment disputes). SEPT. 1994 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 267, at D1-D5 (calling for
arbitrators specializing in employment law to resolve employment disputes).
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activity, rather than the securities laws and industry customs and practices
which are only relevant to commercial disputes.27 °
Moreover, this modification is based on the fact that discrimination
claims involve a legal, universal standard, i.e., what a reasonable person
would conclude, not what a reasonable person in the securities industry
would conclude.2 7' While commercial industry disputes focus on industry
custom and practice, these standards are irrelevant in discrimination
suits.2 72 The current arbitration system pulls the securities industry from
the reach of the antidiscrimination laws because of the system's reliance
on self-review of industry custom and practice. 73 A requirement that
arbitrators have experience or training in employment discrimination dis-
putes would place securities industry employees on the same footing as
those seeking relief in a judicial forum. By giving arbitrators the knowl-
edge to understand and apply the federal policies and standards devel-
oped under the civil rights laws this equal footing is assured. 74
An arbitrator specialization requirement for discrimination suits could
be met through a comprehensive mandatory training program or focused
recruitment efforts.275 If the current "pool" of SRO arbitrators fails to
provide an adequate number of arbitrators with a specialization in em-
ployment discrimination law,276 non-SRO arbitrators, such as those affili-
270. See supra note 240 (outlining the key civil rights laws governing the employment
relationship).
271. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 73 (1986) (setting out the stan-
dard for discrimination as conduct which a reasonable person would find hostile).
272. See Brunet, supra note 248, at 85 (explaining that arbitrators are not confined to
the substantive rules of law, but may fashion equitable awards reflecting facts and
circumstances).
273. Id. (noting that the absence of written, reasoned arbitral awards combined with
limited judicial review of arbitral awards, allows arbitrators to disregard the substantive
rules of law).
274. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1682 (suggesting that arbitrator pools be classi-
fied by area of substantive expertise, such that the expertise parallels the substantive issue
involved).
275. Id. at 1681 (recommending that the curriculum for a mandatory training program
for arbitrators cover substantive areas of law and procedural issues that will be supple-
mented with continuing arbitrator training on an ongoing basis); see Attorney Interview,
supra note 170 (stating that employment law training seminars are currently offered by the
NASD, but remain optional).
276. BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 372 (explaining Professor Constan-
tine Katsoris' proposal for a unified arbitration forum). A consolidation of the various
arbitration pools would allow for dispersed pools of "experienced public arbitrators [to] be
combined and shared." Id.; see MAsUccl & MORRIS, supra note 118, at 318-19 (inferring
that the majority of arbitrators have a securities industry background).
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ated with the American Arbitration Association (AAA),277 who have an
expertise in employment discrimination laws, should be utilized.278
1. A Fair Arbitration System Can Be Developed
While requiring arbitrator expertise in employment discrimination law
is an effective "patchjob," it fails to address the procedural limitations
that detrimentally effect civil rights claims- limited discovery, limited
right to appeal, and lack of written, reasoned decisions.279 A fair arbitra-
tion system for employment discrimination claims would permit an indi-
vidual to choose the method of enforcement of their statutory
employment rights rather than making the choice a condition of employ-
ment through an employment contract. 280 Further, a fair system would
offer safeguards to ensure the selection of neutral and knowledgeable ar-
bitrators. 281 Such a system would provide both parties an active role in
the arbitrator selection process.282 The arbitrator selected should be
from a pool of neutral arbitrators demographically representative of the
workplace, with consideration given to his or her subject matter exper-
tise, specifically, specialization in the employment discrimination laws.283
Additionally, the right to independent representation throughout the ar-
bitration proceeding should be preserved.284
277. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a public, non-profit, organization
offering arbitration services for a broad range of fields. AAA RULES, supra note 140, at 3.
278. Cf Symposium, supra note 18, at 1680 (commenting that the use of expert arbitra-
tors dilutes the intent of the self regulatory principle-which is peer review of the
industry).
279. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (discussing the detrimental impact
arbitration procedures have on civil rights disputes).
280. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 33 n.15 (noting that compulsory arbitra-
tion forces employees to give up their right to pursue a claim in court or give up their job, a
choice contrary to the social and economic safeguards intended by the employment laws);
see also Magyar, supra note 3, at 643 n.18 (outlining the distinction between pre-dispute
agreements and post-dispute agreements).
281. See SEPT. 1994 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 267, at D-2 through D-3 (explaining
the importance of neutral, knowledgeable arbitrators).
282. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. supra note 174, at 31 (stating that the co-selection of arbi-
trators by both the employer and employee helps to ensure quality in private arbitration);
see also Berger, supra note 246, at 716 (advocating the joint selection of potential arbitra-
tors by both the employee and employer).
283. See BLUMBERG CANE & SHUB, supra note 20, at 370 (noting that lack of arbitrator
training has a negative impact on the quality of arbitrators); 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. supra
note 174, at 31-32 (stating that arbitrator neutrality could be further preserved by having
both parties contribute to the arbitrator's fee).
284. SEPT. 1994 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 267, at D-3 (explaining that parties
should be represented by counsel of their choosing); see also Berger, supra note 246, at 717
(stating that individuals are disadvantaged by the absence of adequate representation).
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Procedural safeguards should be implemented to allow for the unique
nature of employment disputes, such as flexible pre-hearing discovery,285
arbitral authority to provide remedies similar to those provided in a judi-
cial forum,2 86 a requirement for reasoned, written, public opinions,2 87 as
well as active Commission oversight to ensure that SROS are responding
to Commission recommendations. 88 Similarly, a more intensive scope of
judicial review should be instituted to determine whether the arbitral de-
cision reflected an understanding of the relevant antidiscrimination laws,
policies, and standards.2 8
9
2. Removal of Employment Claims from Mandatory Arbitration
Unless SROs are prepared to design an arbitration system that pro-
vides the procedural and substantive mechanisms necessary to protect
statutory civil rights, the proposed legislation prohibiting arbitration of
285. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 31 (stressing the importance of access to
personnel files in disparate impact of claims); see also Brunet, supra note 248, at 86 (com-
menting that full "litigation-style discovery" and "formal rules of evidence" inhibit the
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration).
286. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212,
1218-19 (1995) (holding that a New York choice of law provision contained in a PDAA
does not preclude an award of punitive damages). The choice of law provision in Mas-
trobuono attempted to take advantage of a New York law precluding the award of punitive
damages by arbitrators. Id. at 1214. Effectively, this provision forced customers signing
the PDAA to give away substantive rights available to them under New York law. Id. at
1219. The Court found that the choice of law provision was not in itself an unequivocal
agreement to exclude punitive damages from arbitration. Id. at 1218-19. In short, the
Court suggests that punitive damages are excluded from arbitration only if the contract
explicitly provides. Id. at 1219.
If the same philosophy applies when a registered representative signs an employment
contract containing a PDAA, the contract would have to explicitly provide for the preclu-
sion of an individual's right to pursue the substantive rights available to them under the
antidiscrimination laws. See 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. supra note 174, at 32 (providing that
those arbitrators ruling on the antidiscrimination laws "should be empowered to award
whatever relief-including reinstatement, back pay, additional economic damages, puni-
tive awards, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees-that would be available" in a judicial
forum).
287. See 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. supra note 174, at 32 (stating that while written arbitral
opinions need not be modeled after court opinions, they should set out the basis for an
arbitrator's decision); see, e.g., Symposium, supra note 18, at 1623 (pointing out the nega-
tive ramifications on an industry member when an award favoring a claimant is not accom-
panied by a written opinion).
288. 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (recommending that the SEC implement a
formal inspection cycle focused on SRO arbitration).
289. 1995 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 174, at 32 (explaining that reviewing courts
must ensure that "relevant legal doctrines" have been understood and applied). For exam-
ple, an arbitral decision should reflect and apply the universal, reasonable person standard
set out in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 73 (1986), when ruling on a sexual
harassment claim.
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civil rights claims may be the most effective solution to safeguard the civil
rights of securities industry employees.29° The removal of discrimination
cases from the arbitration forum unquestionably furthers the deterrent
and remedial function of the civil rights laws by preserving a judicial reso-
lution of such disputes and by safeguarding the statutory protections of
the civil rights laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
While securities industry arbitration of nonemployment-related claims
is appropriate, the Court's decision in Gilmer fails to demand that a pri-
vate arbitration system offer certain quality standards that ensure the
fairness and adequacy of the arbitral process and the protection of public
rights inherent in state and federal employment discrimination laws.
Therefore, the arbitration codes of the various SROs should be amended
to accommodate the resolution of employment discrimination disputes.
These amendments should require that arbitrator-selection criteria in-
clude subject matter expertise, and provide for the requisite procedural
protections of civil rights claims in light of the deterrent and remedial
functions of the antidiscrimination laws. Absent these modifications,
which recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the current securities
industry arbitration system, the most appropriate alternative may be the
implementation of the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act which will
restrict the availability of such a forum for the resolution of employment
discrimination disputes. In an era of expanded rights and remedies, the
securities industry must react to both the qualitative and quantitative ex-
pansion of this arena to remain an adequate substitute for the judicial
forum.
Megan L. Dunphy
290. See CONG. REC., supra note 179, at E1753 (statement of Rep. Markey) (introduc-
ing the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act which would prohibit the compulsory arbi-
tration of civil rights disputes).
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